{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00001794","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","CVE-2026-63493"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for snipe/snipe-it. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.0 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T18:49:38.127Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-a73b1863421b02b7b178f5594e87c2c3"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T18:49:38.127Z","value":"8.6 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-a73b1863421b02b7b178f5594e87c2c3"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.325%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25604. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"},{"id":"sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"sr-a73b1863421b02b7b178f5594e87c2c3","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63493","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-63493","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"},{"id":"sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-63493","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.860Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["< 8.7.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.7.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:17.662Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T16:39:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T16:38:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001794","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","CVE-2026-63493"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for snipe/snipe-it. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.0 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.325%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25604. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"},{"id":"sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"sr-057b5dd010326a722671497d5cac9c7e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-63493","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.860Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["< 8.7.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.7.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.006Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T16:39:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T16:38:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001794","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","CVE-2026-63493"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for snipe/snipe-it. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.0 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.325%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25626. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"},{"id":"sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-63493","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5af68ae77500533491ba207c0c60ddcc"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["< 8.7.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.7.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.918Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T16:39:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T16:38:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001794","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","CVE-2026-63493"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for snipe/snipe-it. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.0 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.325%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25626. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"sr-5023806d193f81eeccf0d8bf61484a55","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-63493","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.7.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:17.288Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T16:45:06.497Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T16:38:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001794","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","CVE-2026-63493"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for snipe/snipe-it. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.7.0 for snipe/snipe-it. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00aab6306aa344d97868f04e174fb4e3"],"technology":"snipe/snipe-it","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn attacker who knows a victim's password fully bypasses that account's 2FA and obtains a persistent token with full API access as the user (read and write across the user's permissions, including admin if the victim is an admin).\n\nThe token is an API credential, not a web/UI session (using it on web routes redirects to `/login`), but the REST API covers essentially the whole application. If the victim is an admin, the token can also call the admin `users/two_factor_reset` endpoint, which is in the same un-gated API surface, to clear the account's enrolled 2FA. The next login is then forced to re-enroll a second factor, which the password-holding attacker can complete with their own device, taking over the account's web access and locking the legitimate user out.\n\n### Summary:\n\n2FA is enforced only by the `web` middleware group, not the `api` group, and the personal-access-token endpoint is in the `api` group. A session that has passed the password check but not the 2FA can mint a persistent API token and use it for full API access. \n\n\n### Details:\n\n`CheckForTwoFactor` is in the `web` group but not the `api` group:\n\n    // app/Http/Kernel.php\n    'web' => [ ..., CheckFo","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 8.7.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T21:53:28.049Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T16:45:06.497Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T16:38:27.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.433Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}