{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00001799","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","CVE-2026-59941"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for dompdf/dompdf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-37bb2cf36d6ebb03c3ad0849356c12b2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.6 for dompdf/dompdf. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.644%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50872. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-37bb2cf36d6ebb03c3ad0849356c12b2"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-476e49a135a791553299c9fc87f5447d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:42:43.803Z"},{"id":"sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-37bb2cf36d6ebb03c3ad0849356c12b2","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59941","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.284Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-476e49a135a791553299c9fc87f5447d"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.750Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:35.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001799","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","CVE-2026-59941"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for dompdf/dompdf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.6 for dompdf/dompdf. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.644%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50876. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-476e49a135a791553299c9fc87f5447d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:42:43.803Z"},{"id":"sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59941","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-476e49a135a791553299c9fc87f5447d"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.918Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:35.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001799","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","CVE-2026-59941"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for dompdf/dompdf. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.6 for dompdf/dompdf. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.644%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50876. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-70b9e21d7ebe3485468e28e7a215b9f9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59941","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.587Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T23:11:43.568Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001799","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","CVE-2026-59941"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for dompdf/dompdf. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.1.6 for dompdf/dompdf. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-00d32f3159e4b179c2e7ac5a8ae15120"],"technology":"dompdf/dompdf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\ndompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.\n \nA payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a **169-byte** request drove dompdf to render to **~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s** of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.\n\n\n### Details\n## Root cause\n \nThe image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:\n \n```php\n// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134\nlist($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());\nif (($width && $height && in_array($type, [\"gif\",\"png\",\"jpeg\",\"bmp\",\"svg\",\"webp\"], tru","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T21:53:28.050Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-22T23:11:43.568Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-22T22:50:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}