{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00001948","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: Symlink path traversal out of trusted directories","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","CVE-2026-62992"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-095cd352a08fe764a9cd6c0c3f7f997b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T16:10:00.153Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-589dbdb9bbbf4162891dd4cd8735256a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.533%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45085. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-095cd352a08fe764a9cd6c0c3f7f997b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"sr-589dbdb9bbbf4162891dd4cd8735256a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62992","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-62992","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"},{"id":"sr-095cd352a08fe764a9cd6c0c3f7f997b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62992","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.076Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:41.562Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-07T15:25:57.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-07T15:02:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001948","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: Symlink path traversal out of trusted directories","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","CVE-2026-62992"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T16:10:00.153Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-589dbdb9bbbf4162891dd4cd8735256a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.533%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45052. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"sr-589dbdb9bbbf4162891dd4cd8735256a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62992","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-62992","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"},{"id":"sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62992","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.266Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-07T15:25:57.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-07T15:02:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001948","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: Symlink path traversal out of trusted directories","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","CVE-2026-62992"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.533%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45052. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"sr-5f996c0e5f1c51f72fe636cbdb0f8db8","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62992","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:45:38.532Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-07T15:25:57.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-07T15:02:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"},{"id":"NVI-00001948","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: Symlink path traversal out of trusted directories","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","CVE-2026-62992"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-f6wf-28g6-769x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0626cb5bd79524716883c4eb12a11ae8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When Smarty's Security policy is enabled, secure_dir (and the configured template/trusted directories) restrict which local files a template may read via {include} and {fetch}. The trust check in Security::_checkDir() resolved the requested path with Smarty::_realpath(), which normalizes the path as a string only and does not follow symbolic links. A symlink placed inside a trusted directory therefore passed the trust check, while the underlying file_get_contents() followed it to an arbitrary file outside the sandbox (e.g. /etc/passwd).\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker able to (a) cause a symlink to exist inside a trusted directory (e.g. a user-upload area located within the template path) and (b) cause a template to reference that path can read arbitrary files readable by the PHP process, escaping the secure_dir boundary. Confidentiality impact only.\n\n## Patches\nFixed in 5.8.2. Security::_checkDir() now resolves the requested file with native realpath() and re-validates the canonical, symlink-free path against the trusted directories (which are canonicalized the same way, so legitimate symlinked deployment paths such as a Capistrano current symlink or macOS /var → /private/var keep working)","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T21:53:28.059Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-07T15:25:57.110Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-07T15:02:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.710Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}