{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002089","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","CVE-2026-52837"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T21:10:00.130Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.459%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39828. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-07685c8e6e920ccb7703e3d7eedeab00","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52837","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52837","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52837","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-07685c8e6e920ccb7703e3d7eedeab00"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is expos","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is expos","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.534Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:28:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:28:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002089","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","CVE-2026-52837"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T21:10:00.130Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.459%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39828. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52837","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52837","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-6a7c56aab6ecc021252930ca7dfe9d42","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52837","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is expos","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.552Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:45:35.488Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:28:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002089","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","CVE-2026-52837"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T21:10:00.130Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"sr-49b986d492c8d0f22eaae82ada744b1b","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52837","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52837","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is expos","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.647Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:45:35.488Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:28:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002089","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments has unauthenticated customer PII disclosure on booking reschedule page","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","CVE-2026-52837"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xgr6-pqjv-3pf8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0aeaa3c6c2f38fb88d0307b7524adc20"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe booking reschedule view at `/index.php/booking/reschedule/{appointment_hash}` (handled by `Booking::index()`) embeds the **entire customer record** as inline JavaScript (`const vars = {... \"customer_data\": {...}, ...}`) without authentication and without field whitelisting. Anyone in possession of the 12-character `appointment_hash` — which appears in plain text in reschedule emails, confirmation page URLs, and operator-side calendar links — can read every column of that customer's row in the `ea_users` table.\n\nVerified against v1.5.2 with a Docker reproduction; a single anonymous GET to the reschedule URL returns 13 customer fields including email, phone, full address, custom fields, timezone, language, LDAP DN, and `id_roles`.\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause\n\n`application/controllers/Booking.php` at line 184 reads the hash from the request, fetches the appointment, then loads the customer with `Customers_model::find()` — which returns the full row, no projection. It then passes the full record into `script_vars()`, which inlines it into the response HTML as a JavaScript constant. The reschedule UI itself uses only `first_name` and `last_name`; everything else is expos","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T21:53:28.064Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:45:35.488Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:28:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.445Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}