{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002413","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has a SVG Sanitizer Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass Leading to Stored XSS","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","CVE-2026-46360"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-da3bc6a64bc72455123ca0795a67caa1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T00:03:44.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.1 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.187%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.08334. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-da3bc6a64bc72455123ca0795a67caa1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46360","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46360","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-da3bc6a64bc72455123ca0795a67caa1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-46360","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T08:10:32.021Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T00:03:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:18:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002413","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has a SVG Sanitizer Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass Leading to Stored XSS","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","CVE-2026-46360"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T00:03:44.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.1 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46360","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46360","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4ccfa571ce23b8c1dfe402847bc8313e"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.869Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T00:03:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:18:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002413","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has a SVG Sanitizer Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass Leading to Stored XSS","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","CVE-2026-46360"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"5.1 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"sr-97113ee80e014e7b1f379e344d53b481","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46360","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46360","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:07.066Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.875Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:18:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002413","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has a SVG Sanitizer Entity Decoding Depth Limit Bypass Leading to Stored XSS","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","CVE-2026-46360"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-whqh-9pq5-c7r3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1771fc211e5545d7a7f8ff85ba24394a"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `SvgSanitizer::decodeAllEntities()` method limits recursive entity decoding to 5 iterations. By wrapping each character of `javascript` in an `href` attribute value with 5 levels of `&amp;` encoding around numeric HTML entities (e.g., `&amp;amp;amp;amp;amp;#106;` for `j`), an attacker can bypass both `isSafe()` detection and `sanitize()` removal. The uploaded SVG is served from the application origin with `image/svg+xml` content type, and the browser's XML parser fully decodes the remaining `&#NNN;` entities, resulting in a clickable `javascript:` link that executes arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** `decodeAllEntities()` at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Helper/SvgSanitizer.php:223-249` limits entity decoding to `maxIterations=5`. Each iteration: (1) decodes `&#NNN;` numeric entities, (2) decodes `&#xHH;` hex entities, (3) calls `html_entity_decode()` which resolves one level of `&amp;` → `&`. With 5 levels of `&amp;` wrapping, all 5 iterations are consumed unwinding the `&amp;` nesting, leaving the final `&#NNN;` numeric entities unresolved.\n\n**Code path:**\n\n1. Authenticated user with `FAQ_EDIT` permission uploads SVG via `POST /admin/api/content/images` (","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:00:33.881Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.875Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:18:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.387Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}