{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002493","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","CVE-2026-55207"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle, pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2025.4.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4be53ff86aa31105d4a645cd65a9b9c8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-10T15:52:52.497Z","value":"8.8 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-4be53ff86aa31105d4a645cd65a9b9c8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.427Z"},{"id":"sr-4be53ff86aa31105d4a645cd65a9b9c8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55207","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55207","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"technology":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        pri","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2025.4.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"technology":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        pri","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.651Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:15:07.223Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:04:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.427Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002493","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: Account Takeover via Password Reset URL Injection allows unauthenticated attacker to hijack any admin account with 2FA bypass","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","CVE-2026-55207"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle, pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2025.4.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/studio-backend-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-h854-c3m3-mh5v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.427Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"technology":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        pri","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2025.4.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1aec6a06e9f42b8ef8ef92a1457bfc0a"],"technology":"pimcore/studio-backend-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker takes over any Pimcore admin account by sending a password reset request with an attacker-controlled `resetPasswordUrl`. The server generates a real cryptographic recovery token, appends it to the attacker's URL, and emails the link to the victim. When the victim clicks the link in their email, the token is sent to the attacker's server. The attacker then uses `POST /pimcore-studio/api/login/token` to authenticate as the victim with full admin privileges. Token login explicitly disables two-factor authentication, so even accounts with TOTP/Google Authenticator are compromised.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Unauthenticated Endpoint Accepts Attacker URL\n\nThe reset password endpoint at `src/User/Controller/ResetPasswordController.php` line 53 is public (uses `PUBLIC_STUDIO_API` voter). The `ResetPassword` schema at `src/User/Schema/ResetPassword.php` accepts a `resetPasswordUrl` string as a required parameter with zero validation. No URL scheme check, no domain allowlist, no comparison against the configured system domain.\n\n```php\nfinal readonly class ResetPassword\n{\n    public function __construct(\n        private string $username,\n        pri","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:00:33.892Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:15:07.223Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:04:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.427Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}