{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002523","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib — non-constant-time X25519 scalar multiplication permits full private-key recovery","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","CVE-2026-84308"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-19393c981d82cd61a113393c735fdce1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.57 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.1 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","value":"6.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.327%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25909. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-19393c981d82cd61a113393c735fdce1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84308","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-84308","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:58.008Z"},{"id":"sr-19393c981d82cd61a113393c735fdce1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-84308","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.072Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:38.946Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:24:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002523","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib — non-constant-time X25519 scalar multiplication permits full private-key recovery","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","CVE-2026-84308"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-93a029825b9431119c39ce4fce48dcbf"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.57 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.1 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","value":"6.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.327%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.25814. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-93a029825b9431119c39ce4fce48dcbf"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84308","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-84308","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:58.008Z"},{"id":"sr-93a029825b9431119c39ce4fce48dcbf","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-84308","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.385Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.130Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:24:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002523","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib — non-constant-time X25519 scalar multiplication permits full private-key recovery","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","CVE-2026-84308"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.57 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.1 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","value":"6.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"sr-19f7bf0fe00a38c931ef4e82a6839da7","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84308","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-84308","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:58.008Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.535Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:24:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002523","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib — non-constant-time X25519 scalar multiplication permits full private-key recovery","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","CVE-2026-84308"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.57 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.1 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","value":"6.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5914efd1bb6a44d786067b25df6c50ff"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.917Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T21:15:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:24:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002523","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib — non-constant-time X25519 scalar multiplication permits full private-key recovery","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","CVE-2026-84308"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.57 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.1 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q97c-8qh3-fpc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.57"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1c12f1560ead7b037432a06b43f8f0c9"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The pure-PHP X25519 scalar multiplication in phpseclib is not constant-time. Field addition and subtraction each perform a **data-dependent conditional modular reduction**, so the cost of each Montgomery-ladder step is a linear function of that step's reduction count which is a quantity determined by the secret scalar's *prefix*.\n\nAn observer with per-ladder-step resolution recovers the 251-bit clamped private scalar. This is a per-step leak, not an aggregate one: an instrumented code proof-of-concept recovers 20/20 test keys from 32 observed operations, and an observer that counts libgmp calls instead of timing them recovers a key from a **single** operation.\n\nThis is **not** a low-order-input issue. Recovery works with the RFC 7748 base point `u = 9`, with no attacker-chosen input at all. Rejecting low-order public values does not close it.\n\n## 2. Affected component\n\nConfirmed on **phpseclib 3.0.56** (338 files under `phpseclib/`,`sha256(sorted(relpath NUL file_sha256 LF)) = cc7250b611f520e809131aab0931503457c44d8cbfb10d535251c6fec5f62a2b`).\nThe code appears unchanged across the 3.0 series wherever Curve25519 is supported, please confirm the affected range.\n\n| file:line | role |\n","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:00:33.893Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T21:30:09.074Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:24:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}