{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony Vulnerable to Identity Spoofing via Unanchored DN Regex in X509Authenticator","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","CVE-2026-45063"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:01:08.077Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:01:08.077Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.367%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30508. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:22.747Z"},{"id":"sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45063","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45063","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:02.489Z"},{"id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45063","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0-BETA1, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0-BETA1, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0-BETA1, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0-BETA1, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0-BETA1, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42f8366268bc78106a5780e0899aa436"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0-BETA1, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.861Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-27T16:51:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T16:50:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony Vulnerable to Identity Spoofing via Unanchored DN Regex in X509Authenticator","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","CVE-2026-45063"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:01:08.077Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:01:08.077Z","value":"9.1 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.367%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30508. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"sr-ba7531f58829bd1499338b6e1ea7405c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45063","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45063","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:02.489Z"},{"id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45063","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:17.699Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:06.774Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T16:50:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony Vulnerable to Identity Spoofing via Unanchored DN Regex in X509Authenticator","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","CVE-2026-45063"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.367%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30508. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"sr-114bd9d6e0e1e5fff5fed7998af20d32","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45063","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.607Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:06.774Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T16:50:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002730","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony Vulnerable to Identity Spoofing via Unanchored DN Regex in X509Authenticator","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","CVE-2026-45063"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.52 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-ph86-p8f6-f9r2","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.4.52"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0-BETA1; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0-BETA1; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-24974108d5f710fc521a0991d66c36d9"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`X509Authenticator` implements client-certificate (mTLS) authentication: the web server validates the client's certificate against a trusted CA, then passes the certificate's Subject DN (Distinguished Name: a string like `CN=Alice,O=Example,emailAddress=alice@example.com`) to Symfony via `$_SERVER['SSL_CLIENT_S_DN']`. Symfony extracts the user identifier from that string.\n\nThe extraction uses an **unanchored** regex that matches `emailAddress=` anywhere in the DN string: including inside the *value* of a different RDN (Relative Distinguished Name: one `key=value` component of the DN), such as `CN`. An attacker who can obtain a certificate from a trusted CA with a free-text `CN` can smuggle `emailAddress=victim@target` inside the CN value and be authenticated as the victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nThe `X509Authenticator` now uses a regex that anchors the match to an RDN boundary (start of string, or following a `,` / `/` separator).\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for report","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0-BETA1; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:00:33.902Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:06.774Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T16:50:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.991Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}