{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002914","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","CVE-2026-54182"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1401e69afd668789f5ca2226f535f0d0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-b438bc48d547c5cb8bc563556fbad472"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.781%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.56068. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1401e69afd668789f5ca2226f535f0d0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"sr-b438bc48d547c5cb8bc563556fbad472","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54182","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54182","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-1401e69afd668789f5ca2226f535f0d0","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54182","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.331Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T08:10:32.029Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002914","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","CVE-2026-54182"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-b438bc48d547c5cb8bc563556fbad472"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.781%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.55965. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"sr-b438bc48d547c5cb8bc563556fbad472","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54182","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54182","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54182","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:17.689Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002914","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","CVE-2026-54182"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.781%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.55965. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"sr-a073e60e65c72645de8af2263d11a318","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54182","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.177Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002914","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","CVE-2026-54182"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1d0118c2c73a04b1fb8ed69cb6a4e02d"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.546Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:56.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002914","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: OS command injection in Stats::makeCurlRequest via attacker-controlled Host header (pre-auth)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","CVE-2026-54182"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.72 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.2 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.13 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.36 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mrc5-3mm3-45c5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.1.72"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.6.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2b64e55e315ec3acec0dd6437b411386"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Backpack\\CRUD\\Stats::makeCurlRequest` builds a shell command using unescaped input that originates from the HTTP `Host` header, then passes it to `exec()`. A specially crafted Host header can break out of the shell argument and cause the server to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web user.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reached from `BackpackServiceProvider::boot()` on every HTTP request in production when `exec()` and `curl` are available. A 1-in-100 random gate is the only guard — an attacker can reliably trigger it by retrying.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High — CVSS 8.1**  \n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\nAttack Complexity is rated **High** because default nginx and Apache configurations typically strip or reject malformed Host headers before they reach PHP, and `exec()` is often disabled for web processes in hardened environments. Both mitigations must be absent for exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful exploit yields OS command execution as the web server user (`www-data`, `nginx`, etc.), giving an unauthenticated attacker access to environment secrets (APP_KEY, database credentials, API keys in `.env`), the filesystem, and any service the server can reach","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.36"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:38.459Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:48:07.849Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.983Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}