{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00002997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","CVE-2026-48747"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-28f70c278df5c686efdd34089e2000ed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. 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This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"},{"id":"sr-93dba14ceeab73ac1b91cb1830a79b85","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48747","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-48747","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:22.913Z"},{"id":"sr-28f70c278df5c686efdd34089e2000ed","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.281Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:11.445Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:50.617Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:32:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","CVE-2026-48747"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a7556f30deb622f85c938586c3b143e9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:16:37.080Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-93dba14ceeab73ac1b91cb1830a79b85"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:16:37.080Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-93dba14ceeab73ac1b91cb1830a79b85"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.247%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.16062. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a7556f30deb622f85c938586c3b143e9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. 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Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.381Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.203Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:50.617Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:32:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","CVE-2026-48747"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. 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This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a7556f30deb622f85c938586c3b143e9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.247%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.16062. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a7556f30deb622f85c938586c3b143e9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"},{"id":"sr-a7556f30deb622f85c938586c3b143e9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.381Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.192Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:50.617Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:32:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"},{"id":"NVI-00002997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","CVE-2026-48747"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/mailomat-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/mailomat-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rrj9-5q2j-4gvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/mailomat-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2e934cbda9a8dfd91a7d799ff2469145"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\Mailer\\Bridge\\Mailomat\\Webhook\\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it.\n\nPHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side.\n\nMailomat's documented webhook security pins SHA-256; the parser did not.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:38.467Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:50.617Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:32:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.366Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}