{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003213","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","CVE-2026-54178"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0d952a16801ae957ac19778a523e3669"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.12 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.35 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-b2de6204b73f9cc6542262c76522da08"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.562%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46867. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0d952a16801ae957ac19778a523e3669"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"sr-b2de6204b73f9cc6542262c76522da08","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54178","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-0d952a16801ae957ac19778a523e3669","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.331Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 6.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.35"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.35"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.768Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003213","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","CVE-2026-54178"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.12 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.35 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-b2de6204b73f9cc6542262c76522da08"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.562%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46767. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"sr-b2de6204b73f9cc6542262c76522da08","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54178","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 6.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.35"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.35"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:17.687Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003213","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","CVE-2026-54178"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.12 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.35 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.562%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46767. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, < 6.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5091ea6f5f974cad4794ecacadcb3457"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.35"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.35"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.567Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003213","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","CVE-2026-54178"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.12 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.35 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.562%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46767. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"sr-27d8423a4b9303725c2872f28e8f0f85","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54178","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.35"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.617Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:13.759Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003213","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: Arbitrary file deletion via attacker-controlled clear_[] in HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","CVE-2026-54178"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.12 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.35 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8xjm-wqrp-2f25","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3680f8f18f704b45809866eb23c1f984"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`HasUploadFields::uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (in `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php`) reads file paths from the `clear_[]` request input and deletes them from the configured storage disk **without verifying that the paths belong to the current model record**.\n\nAn authenticated user with Update access on any CRUD that wires `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` as a model mutator (the pattern documented in the v5.x `upload_multiple` field guide) can supply arbitrary disk-relative paths in `clear_[]` to delete files that were never associated with the record they are editing.\n\nThe safe pattern already exists in the codebase: `src/app/Library/Uploaders/MultipleFiles.php` intersects the requested deletions against the files currently stored in the database column before calling `Storage::disk()->delete()`. The trait method lacks that intersection.\n\n## Affected code\n\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/HasUploadFields.php` — `uploadMultipleFilesToDisk` (primary sink)\n- `src/app/Models/Traits/CrudTrait.php` — mixes `HasUploadFields` into all Backpack-managed models\n\nThe vulnerability is present in all 5.x, 6.x < 6.8.12, and 7.x < 7.0.35 releases.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker w","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.35"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:43.400Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:13.759Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.677Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}