{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003485","kind":"vulnerability","title":"MagicLink: Insecure Deserialization of MagicLink Actions Leads to Remote Code Execution","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","CVE-2026-61701"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for cesargb/laravel-magiclink. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.25.1 for cesargb/laravel-magiclink. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-c1134a0e52593dcb8bd8d4a4e90e8390"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.762%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.55376. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-c1134a0e52593dcb8bd8d4a4e90e8390"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.355Z"},{"id":"sr-c1134a0e52593dcb8bd8d4a4e90e8390","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-61701","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b"],"technology":"cesargb/laravel-magiclink","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\nMagicLink stores serialized action objects in the `magic_links.action` database column and deserializes them without integrity validation or class allowlisting in src/MagicLink.php and src/Actions/ResponseAction.php. An attacker with the ability to manipulate database records (e.g., via SQL injection or compromised admin access) could inject malicious serialized objects containing arbitrary closures, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) when the magic link is visited.\n\n## Resolution\n\nThe vulnerability has been mitigated through HMAC-signed serialization using the application key, class allowlisting restricted to `ActionAbstract` subclasses and framework classes, strict type validation preventing arbitrary object storage, and backward compatibility support for legacy data via `allowed_classes` in `unserialize()`. Implementation includes a new Serializable security class with signing/verification, refactored getter/setter methods in MagicLink.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.25.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T21:03:48.011Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T03:56:02.048Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-02-12T22:11:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.355Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003485","kind":"vulnerability","title":"MagicLink: Insecure Deserialization of MagicLink Actions Leads to Remote Code Execution","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","CVE-2026-61701"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for cesargb/laravel-magiclink. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.25.1 for cesargb/laravel-magiclink. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-r33w-fg8j-9c94","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.355Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-405385db60f4d1e0768ff6d4518c2c2b"],"technology":"cesargb/laravel-magiclink","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Description\n\nMagicLink stores serialized action objects in the `magic_links.action` database column and deserializes them without integrity validation or class allowlisting in src/MagicLink.php and src/Actions/ResponseAction.php. An attacker with the ability to manipulate database records (e.g., via SQL injection or compromised admin access) could inject malicious serialized objects containing arbitrary closures, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) when the magic link is visited.\n\n## Resolution\n\nThe vulnerability has been mitigated through HMAC-signed serialization using the application key, class allowlisting restricted to `ActionAbstract` subclasses and framework classes, strict type validation preventing arbitrary object storage, and backward compatibility support for legacy data via `allowed_classes` in `unserialize()`. Implementation includes a new Serializable security class with signing/verification, refactored getter/setter methods in MagicLink.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.25.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:48.018Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T03:56:02.048Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-02-12T22:11:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.355Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}