{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003549","kind":"vulnerability","title":"WWBN AVideo has an Allowlisted downloadURL media extensions bypass SSRF protection and enable internal response exfiltration (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27732)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","CVE-2026-39370"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for WWBN/AVideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-dbd1272f675b0a243a3092cb321ae4e4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T21:10:00.143Z","value":"7.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-dbd1272f675b0a243a3092cb321ae4e4"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-426a5560ed5566e214c5d80f805b8325","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"},{"id":"sr-dbd1272f675b0a243a3092cb321ae4e4","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39370","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-39370","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-426a5560ed5566e214c5d80f805b8325"],"technology":"WWBN/AVideo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-27732 is incomplete.\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` still allows attacker-controlled `downloadURL` values with common media or archive extensions such as `.mp4`, `.mp3`, `.zip`, `.jpg`, `.png`, `.gif`, and `.webm` to bypass SSRF validation. The server then fetches the response and stores it as media content.\n\nThis allows an authenticated uploader to turn the upload-by-URL flow into a reliable SSRF response-exfiltration primitive.\n\n## Details\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts attacker-controlled `downloadURL` and passes it to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()`.\n\nInside that function:\n\n1. the URL extension is extracted from the attacker-controlled path\n2. the extension is checked against an allowlist of normal encoder formats\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is skipped for common media and archive extensions\n4. the URL is fetched via `url_get_contents()`\n5. the fetched body is written into video storage and exposed through normal media metadata\n\nThe current code still contains:\n\n- an extension-based bypass for SSRF validation\n- no mandatory initial-destination SSRF enforcement insi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 26.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.460Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:43.987Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-08T00:08:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003549","kind":"vulnerability","title":"WWBN AVideo has an Allowlisted downloadURL media extensions bypass SSRF protection and enable internal response exfiltration (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27732)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","CVE-2026-39370"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for WWBN/AVideo. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-426a5560ed5566e214c5d80f805b8325"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-426a5560ed5566e214c5d80f805b8325","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cmcr-q4jf-p6q9","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-426a5560ed5566e214c5d80f805b8325"],"technology":"WWBN/AVideo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe fix for CVE-2026-27732 is incomplete.\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` still allows attacker-controlled `downloadURL` values with common media or archive extensions such as `.mp4`, `.mp3`, `.zip`, `.jpg`, `.png`, `.gif`, and `.webm` to bypass SSRF validation. The server then fetches the response and stores it as media content.\n\nThis allows an authenticated uploader to turn the upload-by-URL flow into a reliable SSRF response-exfiltration primitive.\n\n## Details\n\n`objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts attacker-controlled `downloadURL` and passes it to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()`.\n\nInside that function:\n\n1. the URL extension is extracted from the attacker-controlled path\n2. the extension is checked against an allowlist of normal encoder formats\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is skipped for common media and archive extensions\n4. the URL is fetched via `url_get_contents()`\n5. the fetched body is written into video storage and exposed through normal media metadata\n\nThe current code still contains:\n\n- an extension-based bypass for SSRF validation\n- no mandatory initial-destination SSRF enforcement insi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 26.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:48.021Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:43.987Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-08T00:08:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}