{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003689","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","CVE-2026-55072"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-aa2f35b91fdbd7f7e9b8ee4051e83edc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.5 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.9 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-16T13:42:48.283Z","value":"8.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-92efaae5ec36339c93574ed5cb0883d1"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.409%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.35188. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-aa2f35b91fdbd7f7e9b8ee4051e83edc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"},{"id":"sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"sr-92efaae5ec36339c93574ed5cb0883d1","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55072","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55072","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-aa2f35b91fdbd7f7e9b8ee4051e83edc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55072","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["< 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T03:52:54.757Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003689","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","CVE-2026-55072"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-92efaae5ec36339c93574ed5cb0883d1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.5 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.9 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-16T13:42:48.283Z","value":"8.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-92efaae5ec36339c93574ed5cb0883d1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"},{"id":"sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"sr-92efaae5ec36339c93574ed5cb0883d1","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55072","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55072","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["< 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.201Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003689","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","CVE-2026-55072"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.5 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.9 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:16:47.162Z"},{"id":"sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-32271dc76975a5ccbb2ae34738d06e1a"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["< 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.555Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003689","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","CVE-2026-55072"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.5 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.9 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-478c2b6127922a64ed8df58a376741cf"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this->getName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this->getName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^a-zA-Z0-9?/', $this->getId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this->getId(), $this->getName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex match","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:48.027Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-13T14:10:58.634Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-13T13:44:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.642Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}