{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003875","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib has a variable-time HMAC comparison in SSH2::get_binary_packet() using != instead of hash_equals()","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","CVE-2026-40194"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.0.28 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.53 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.51 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-d1b806b2d9740a689c4b98d5e5d8f87e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:44:51.140Z","value":"3.7 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-491596ba75cf1d7e9ed7ef0ebc32f152"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.361%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.29972. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-d1b806b2d9740a689c4b98d5e5d8f87e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"},{"id":"sr-491596ba75cf1d7e9ed7ef0ebc32f152","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40194","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-40194","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"},{"id":"sr-d1b806b2d9740a689c4b98d5e5d8f87e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-40194","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.378Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.1.1; fixed 1.0.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.0.51"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T01:52:04.802Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:02.985Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-10T20:58:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003875","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib has a variable-time HMAC comparison in SSH2::get_binary_packet() using != instead of hash_equals()","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","CVE-2026-40194"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.0.28 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.53 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.51 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-491596ba75cf1d7e9ed7ef0ebc32f152"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:44:51.140Z","value":"3.7 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-491596ba75cf1d7e9ed7ef0ebc32f152"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"},{"id":"sr-491596ba75cf1d7e9ed7ef0ebc32f152","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40194","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-40194","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.1.1; fixed 1.0.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.0.51"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.645Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:02.985Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-10T20:58:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"},{"id":"NVI-00003875","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpseclib has a variable-time HMAC comparison in SSH2::get_binary_packet() using != instead of hash_equals()","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","CVE-2026-40194"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib, phpseclib/phpseclib. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.0.28 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.53 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.51 for phpseclib/phpseclib. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-r854-jrxh-36qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.1.1; fixed 1.0.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4e498fd23330ab2a28d72ae285956de6"],"technology":"phpseclib/phpseclib","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"# phpseclib SSH2: Variable-time comparison in HMAC verification\n\n## Summary\n\n`phpseclib\\Net\\SSH2::get_binary_packet()` uses PHP's `!=` operator to compare a received SSH packet HMAC against the locally computed HMAC. `!=` on equal-length binary strings in PHP uses `memcmp()`, which short-circuits on the first differing byte. This is a real variable-time comparison (CWE-208), proven by scaling benchmarks.\n\nThe finding is **Low severity (defense-in-depth)**, not Critical. Practical exploitation over the network is prevented by SSH's disconnect-on-MAC-failure behavior combined with per-connection session keys. The fix is a one-liner: replace `!=` with `hash_equals()`, which the codebase already uses in 9 other places.\n\n- **Target:** `phpseclib/phpseclib`\n- **File:** `phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php`\n- **Lines (master `e819a163c`):** 3405 and 3410\n- **CWE:** CWE-208 (Observable Timing Discrepancy)\n- **CVSS v3.1:** 3.7 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`\n- **Severity:** Low (cryptographic hygiene / defense-in-depth)\n- **Affected branches:** `master`, `3.0`, `2.0`, `1.0` (all supported versions)\n\n## Root cause\n\n`phpseclib/Net/SSH2.php` lines 3399-3415 (master at `e819a163c`):\n\n```php","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.0.51"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:52.602Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:02.985Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-10T20:58:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.359Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}