{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00003897","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PHPECC vulnerable to multiple cryptographic side-channel attacks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-346h-749j-r28w"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for mdanter/ecc. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4eec4e9562b70bdfa25c3779896af982"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4eec4e9562b70bdfa25c3779896af982","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-346h-749j-r28w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-346h-749j-r28w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.649Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4eec4e9562b70bdfa25c3779896af982"],"technology":"mdanter/ecc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### ECDSA Canonicalization\n\nPHPECC is vulnerable to malleable ECDSA signature attacks. \n\n### Constant-Time Signer\n\nWhen generating a new ECDSA signature, the GMPMath adapter was used. This class wraps the GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic library (GMP), which does not aim to provide constant-time implementations of algorithms.\n\nAn attacker capable of triggering many signatures and studying the time it takes to perform each operation would be able to leak the secret number, `k`, and thereby learn the private key.\n\n### EcDH Timing Leaks\n\nWhen calculating a shared secret using the `EcDH` class, the scalar-point multiplication is based on the arithmetic defined by the `Point` class.\n\nEven though the library implements a Montgomery ladder, the `add()`, `mul()`, and `getDouble()` methods on the `Point` class are not constant-time. This means that your ECDH private keys are leaking information about each bit of your private key through a timing side-channel.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:52.603Z","source_updated_at":"2024-11-28T05:40:55.417Z","source_disclosed_at":"2024-04-25T18:31:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.649Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}