{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","CVE-2026-55825"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0649f0e5b00e6a5197bd16a80e19432e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-06T19:50:01.000Z","value":"3.1 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490Z","value":"3.1 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.296%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22359. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0649f0e5b00e6a5197bd16a80e19432e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T02:28:46.523Z"},{"id":"sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55825","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"},{"id":"sr-0649f0e5b00e6a5197bd16a80e19432e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.051Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.263Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-06T19:50:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-06T19:49:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","CVE-2026-55825"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-06T19:50:01.000Z","value":"3.1 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490Z","value":"3.1 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.296%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22263. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T02:28:46.523Z"},{"id":"sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55825","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"},{"id":"sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-69c299864b256a83f82cc7ae55c3df5a"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.7.0, < 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.934Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-06T19:50:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-06T19:49:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","CVE-2026-55825"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490Z","value":"3.1 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.296%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.22263. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55825","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"},{"id":"sr-7163aa040be694d22c66fe049fe19ece","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.590Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-06T20:00:15.424Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-06T19:49:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","CVE-2026-55825"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:51:43.490Z","value":"3.1 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"sr-3346e8264490dad1021a5a4b22ccc2c8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55825","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55825","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.619Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-06T20:00:15.424Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-06T19:49:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Possible path traversal in job download URIs","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","CVE-2026-55825"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/contao, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/contao. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.7 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-grm4-wm43-9jh5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/contao","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5b30989544a6faab238225e591080559"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nAn authenticated backend user who can access one job can request an attachment identifier containing `../` segments and make the job attachment download endpoint read a file from another job directory inside `var/job-attachments`.\n\nThe controller authorizes only the `jobUuid` route parameter. The later attachment lookup joins that authorized job UUID with the attacker-controlled `identifier`, then passes the combined path to the virtual filesystem. `VirtualFilesystem::resolve()` canonicalizes the whole path and only rejects paths that escape the filesystem mount, so `authorized-job/../victim-job/debug_log.csv` becomes `victim-job/debug_log.csv`.\n\nThis is a cross-job authorization bypass for known job attachment paths. It is not a practical brute-force against unknown jobs because job directories are UUID v4 values.\n\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`JobsController::downloadJobAttachment()` checks access to the route `jobUuid` before loading the attachment:\n\n```php\n$job = $this->jobs->getByUuid($jobUuid);\n\nif (!$job || !$this->jobs->hasAccess($job)) {\n    throw $this->createNotFoundException();\n}\n\n$attachment = $this->jobs->getAttachment($jobUuid, $identifier);\n```\n\n`Jobs::getAttachment(","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.7.0; fixed 5.7.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:52.631Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-06T20:00:15.424Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-06T19:49:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.421Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}