{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004176","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailtrap Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the X-Mt-Signature HMAC — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","CVE-2026-45755"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1abb9a927f81682a84fc7e91eb6684e8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.267%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.18867. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1abb9a927f81682a84fc7e91eb6684e8"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"sr-1abb9a927f81682a84fc7e91eb6684e8","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45755","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.436Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.630Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:33:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004176","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailtrap Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the X-Mt-Signature HMAC — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","CVE-2026-45755"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0c288319abd67381ba690937d1fc0906"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.267%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.18896. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0c288319abd67381ba690937d1fc0906"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"sr-0c288319abd67381ba690937d1fc0906","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45755","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.279Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.041Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.630Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:33:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004176","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailtrap Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the X-Mt-Signature HMAC — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","CVE-2026-45755"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8b957811a8367af0b1d214ca0a67bd8c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.267%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.18899. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-8b957811a8367af0b1d214ca0a67bd8c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"sr-8b957811a8367af0b1d214ca0a67bd8c","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45755","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.133Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.630Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:33:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004176","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Mailtrap Mailer Webhook Parser Never Verifies the X-Mt-Signature HMAC — Unauthenticated Webhook Event Injection","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","CVE-2026-45755"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/mailtrap-mailer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/mailtrap-mailer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-59f3-vp2f-mp9w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/mailtrap-mailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.2.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5bd86e7f91a7f4f3066ba0ace11df839"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Mailtrap mailer bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the event callbacks Mailtrap POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Mt-Signature` HMAC header Mailtrap sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Mailtrap webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged event payloads, fake delivery / bounce / open / click / spam events, leading to suppression-list corruption, delivery-metrics fraud, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`MailtrapRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Mt-Signature` header, an HMAC-SHA256 of the raw request body keyed with the configured secret, before decoding the payload, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: signature verification remains opt-in, but it is now actually enforced once opted i","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:52.632Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:45.630Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-28T17:33:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.680Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}