{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004300","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp SP accepts a response from an unexpected IdP when unsigned `Response/InResponseTo` is combined with a signed assertion lacking `SubjectConfirmationData/InResponseTo`","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","CVE-2026-49284"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp, simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.5.2 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-30T13:39:25.117Z","value":"7.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-b1329a5cc40cb60f1d0f5af685b2db93"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.222%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12838. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"},{"id":"sr-b1329a5cc40cb60f1d0f5af685b2db93","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49284","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-49284","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:22.913Z"},{"id":"sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-49284","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.856Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.5.0; fixed 2.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.4.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T15:18:17.684Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:52.943Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:47:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004300","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp SP accepts a response from an unexpected IdP when unsigned `Response/InResponseTo` is combined with a signed assertion lacking `SubjectConfirmationData/InResponseTo`","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","CVE-2026-49284"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp, simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.5.2 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.222%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12838. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"},{"id":"sr-111bcbb50b14f7dd5e7dbd55b5c9b588","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-49284","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.856Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.5.0; fixed 2.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.4.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.606Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:52.943Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:47:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004300","kind":"vulnerability","title":"SimpleSAMLphp SP accepts a response from an unexpected IdP when unsigned `Response/InResponseTo` is combined with a signed assertion lacking `SubjectConfirmationData/InResponseTo`","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","CVE-2026-49284"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp, simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.5.2 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.7 for simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q8r6-xj3f-wrrm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.5.0; fixed 2.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6083e44bf88f2b648c327cc49d8152ea"],"technology":"simplesamlphp/simplesamlphp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nSimpleSAMLphp's SAML SP ACS path does not enforce the IdP selected for an SP-initiated login. If a saved SP state contains `ExpectedIssuer = IdP A`, but the ACS receives a valid response from `IdP B`, the code logs a warning and continues processing instead of rejecting the response.\n\nThat behavior becomes security-relevant when combined with the response-processing rule that accepts an unsigned `samlp:Response/@InResponseTo` outside the signed assertion whenever the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData` does not carry its own `InResponseTo`. A response issued by one trusted IdP can therefore be bound to SP state created for another IdP.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-IdP deployment, a lower-trust IdP can satisfy SP state created for a different expected IdP. This can bypass an SP flow that intentionally routes the user to a specific IdP, including deployments that set `enable_unsolicited` to `false` to prevent IdP-initiated logins.\n\nThe impact is highest when the SP trusts multiple IdPs with different assurance levels, tenant boundaries, or attribute namespaces, and application authorization depends on the selected/expected IdP. In those deployments this is an authentic","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.4.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:52.640Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:52.943Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T20:47:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.000Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}