{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","CVE-2026-55220"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-895388e211b1c6152b3e0a199ea9a800"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.10 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"9.3 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5d95f81a42296823beaddc83a1bef783"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.680%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.52419. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-895388e211b1c6152b3e0a199ea9a800"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"},{"id":"sr-5d95f81a42296823beaddc83a1bef783","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55220","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55220","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-895388e211b1c6152b3e0a199ea9a800","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55220","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["<= 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T02:33:09.125Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","CVE-2026-55220"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5d95f81a42296823beaddc83a1bef783"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.10 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.080Z","value":"9.3 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5d95f81a42296823beaddc83a1bef783"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"},{"id":"sr-5d95f81a42296823beaddc83a1bef783","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55220","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55220","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["<= 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.274Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","CVE-2026-55220"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.10 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2026.1.0, <= 2026.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-41f447753de3f9dd2f11b977ef1fcf0b"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["<= 12.3.9"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.204Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Pimcore Hotspotimage getDataFromResource() unrestricted Serialize::unserialize over object-store column (PHP Object Injection, CWE-502)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","CVE-2026-55220"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for pimcore/pimcore, pimcore/pimcore. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2026.1.6 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 12.3.10 for pimcore/pimcore. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2026.1.0; fixed 2026.1.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-65ce305cc9afef3ebef0c6c7b8151edd"],"technology":"pimcore/pimcore","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\ClassDefinition\\Data\\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()` deserializes the `*__hotspots` object-store column through the `Pimcore\\Tool\\Serialize::unserialize()` wrapper **without a class allowlist** (the wrapper's `$allowedClasses` parameter defaults to `true`, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-`serialize()`d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted `unserialize()` over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the `*__hotspots` store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (`__wakeup`/`__destruct`) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. `guzzlehttp/guzzle`).\n\nThe same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers `ImageGallery`, `Block`, and `Video`, which use the identical `json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...)` fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: `Serialize::unserialize()` defaults to","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 12.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:57.125Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T19:40:40.699Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T19:13:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.380Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}