{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","CVE-2026-47212"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-379f5ad64b2bb76a2187cc86ad05118f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"1.506%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.74376. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-379f5ad64b2bb76a2187cc86ad05118f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:14.635Z"},{"id":"sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47212","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-379f5ad64b2bb76a2187cc86ad05118f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.280Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.749Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","CVE-2026-47212"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"1.506%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.74377. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T00:53:14.635Z"},{"id":"sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47212","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.4.0, < 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5125cc34bd467178df7a9f8c30210de1"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:47.487Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","CVE-2026-47212"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:03:11.553Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"1.506%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.74377. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"sr-01ad413e5db09a1fe4388002e58e185a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47212","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.479Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:04.682Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","CVE-2026-47212"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"1.506%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.74377. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"sr-16b6ae723aaf1f7d0424c93432c26598","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-47212","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:06.724Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:04.682Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004691","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: Twilio SMS Notifier allows unauthenticated webhook injection due to missing X-Twilio-Signature verification","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","CVE-2026-47212"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony, symfony/twilio-notifier, symfony/twilio-notifier. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/twilio-notifier. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-55rj-x2vc-4whq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6f993c602b3d4874ffa85f6cd95a21c3"],"technology":"symfony/twilio-notifier","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\nThe Twilio SMS notifier bridge ships a webhook request parser used to authenticate and decode the status callbacks Twilio POSTs to an application's webhook endpoint. Its `doParse(Request $request, #[\\SensitiveParameter] string $secret)` method receives the configured webhook secret but never reads it; it decodes and returns the payload unconditionally, ignoring the `X-Twilio-Signature` HMAC header Twilio sends with each request.\n\nAs a result, an application that wires up the Twilio webhook endpoint accepts **any** POST to that URL, even when a signing secret is configured (the recommended setup). An attacker who knows the endpoint exists can submit forged status payloads, fake delivered / failed / undelivered events, leading to delivery-metrics fraud, downstream automation triggers, etc.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`TwilioRequestParser::doParse()` now requires and verifies the `X-Twilio-Signature` header (HMAC-SHA1 over the full request URL concatenated with the alphabetically-sorted POST parameters, base64-encoded, keyed with the Twilio account auth token) before further processing, using a constant-time comparison.\n\nWhen no secret is configured the behaviour is unchanged: s","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:57.138Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:04.682Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-29T21:32:23.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.678Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}