{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004783","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery when opening XLSX file","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","CVE-2024-45290"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpexcel. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.3.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.29.2 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T07:53:57.660Z","value":"7.7 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-966860d5882412e2618848b57e7968f9"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T07:53:57.660Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-966860d5882412e2618848b57e7968f9"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.625%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50006. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"},{"id":"sr-966860d5882412e2618848b57e7968f9","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45290","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2024-45290","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:36.384Z"},{"id":"sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2024-45290","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.368Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.3.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.29.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpexcel","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.8.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:07.065Z","source_updated_at":"2026-02-04T04:16:11.602Z","source_disclosed_at":"2024-10-07T15:57:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004783","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery when opening XLSX file","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","CVE-2024-45290"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpexcel. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.3.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.29.2 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.625%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50006. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"},{"id":"sr-62b5ad5fcf945d669fb7125f0ec23e7d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2024-45290","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.368Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.3.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.29.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpexcel","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.8.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:45:38.543Z","source_updated_at":"2026-02-04T04:16:11.602Z","source_disclosed_at":"2024-10-07T15:57:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004783","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery when opening XLSX file","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","CVE-2024-45290"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpexcel. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.3.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.29.2 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.1 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.3.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.29.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7324a33964e81c4328245fd49dbb0a71"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpexcel","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nIt's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL.\n\nNote that this vulnerability is different from GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4, and resides in a different component.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive:\n\n```php\nif (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) {\n    // ...omit irrelevant code...\n} else {\n    $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem(\n        $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'),\n        'link'\n    );\n    if (isset($images[$linkImageKey])) {\n        $url = str_replace('xl/drawings/', '', $images[$linkImageKey]);\n        $objDrawing->setPath($url);\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`setPath()` then reads the file in order to determine the file type a","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.8.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:57.142Z","source_updated_at":"2026-02-04T04:16:11.602Z","source_disclosed_at":"2024-10-07T15:57:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.921Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}