{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00004886","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","CVE-2026-52841"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-96bc43f6764c828d0724f3508852bdec"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-29T16:29:27.000Z","value":"3.1 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T21:10:00.130Z","value":"3.1 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-96bc43f6764c828d0724f3508852bdec"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-96bc43f6764c828d0724f3508852bdec","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52841","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52841","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in.\n- The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at `application/config/google.php` - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all.\n- Default deployment per the project's own `docker-compose.yml`; no non-default flags required.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Google.php:278-289\npublic function oauth(string $provider_id): void\n{\n    if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {\n        show_error('Forbidden', 403);\n    }\n\n    // Store the provider id for use on the callback function.\n    session(['oauth_provider_id'","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in.\n- The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at `application/config/google.php` - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all.\n- Default deployment per the project's own `docker-compose.yml`; no non-default flags required.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Google.php:278-289\npublic function oauth(string $provider_id): void\n{\n    if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {\n        show_error('Forbidden', 403);\n    }\n\n    // Store the provider id for use on the callback function.\n    session(['oauth_provider_id'","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:07.065Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:29:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:29:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004886","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","CVE-2026-52841"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-29T16:29:27.000Z","value":"3.1 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6c081c291a617830db526f6eaa775ccb"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in.\n- The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at `application/config/google.php` - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all.\n- Default deployment per the project's own `docker-compose.yml`; no non-default flags required.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Google.php:278-289\npublic function oauth(string $provider_id): void\n{\n    if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {\n        show_error('Forbidden', 403);\n    }\n\n    // Store the provider id for use on the callback function.\n    session(['oauth_provider_id'","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in.\n- The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at `application/config/google.php` - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all.\n- Default deployment per the project's own `docker-compose.yml`; no non-default flags required.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Google.php:278-289\npublic function oauth(string $provider_id): void\n{\n    if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {\n        show_error('Forbidden', 403);\n    }\n\n    // Store the provider id for use on the callback function.\n    session(['oauth_provider_id'","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:27.937Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:29:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:29:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00004886","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's Google sync","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","CVE-2026-52841"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hm4-r66f-29wr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-77790269373e504549d0f44047968129"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider's Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer's appointments then sync into the attacker's calendar with each customer's name and email attached as attendee data.\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- Attacker holds a backend login on the target instance (admin, provider, or secretary). The customer role cannot log in.\n- The instance has Google Calendar OAuth configured at `application/config/google.php` - i.e. any deployment that uses the Google sync feature at all.\n- Default deployment per the project's own `docker-compose.yml`; no non-default flags required.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// application/controllers/Google.php:278-289\npublic function oauth(string $provider_id): void\n{\n    if (!$this->session->userdata('user_id')) {\n        show_error('Forbidden', 403);\n    }\n\n    // Store the provider id for use on the callback function.\n    session(['oauth_provider_id'","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; last_affected 1.5.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:57.146Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:45:35.660Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:29:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}