{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005004","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","CVE-2026-107848"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-21d73f5796050d22b281b36609405d45"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T20:54:02.000Z","value":"3.5 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-16T17:17:04.113Z","value":"3.5 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3b2e090f4b62739b49147d4d8c336fde"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.115%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.01556. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-21d73f5796050d22b281b36609405d45"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"sr-3b2e090f4b62739b49147d4d8c336fde","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107848","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:38.141Z"},{"id":"sr-21d73f5796050d22b281b36609405d45","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.840Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.739Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005004","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","CVE-2026-107848"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T20:54:02.000Z","value":"3.5 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-16T17:17:04.113Z","value":"3.5 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-3b2e090f4b62739b49147d4d8c336fde"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.115%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.01561. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"sr-3b2e090f4b62739b49147d4d8c336fde","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107848","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:38.141Z"},{"id":"sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.628Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005004","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","CVE-2026-107848"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. 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Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-412a67f229135299607589a3bfdb2ab2"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.609Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:02.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005004","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","CVE-2026-107848"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.115%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.01561. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"sr-215a8bd99d077285bd6c1252755997fc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107848","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.609Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T21:00:09.537Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005004","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","CVE-2026-107848"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d0de73c70350b97c2653c7b28e8d935"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:12:57.151Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T21:00:09.537Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.685Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}