{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005019","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Unauthenticated Password Reset Endpoint Allows User Enumeration and Forced Password Change Without Token Validation","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","CVE-2026-35676"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-141bd80b9d96758f38987ba1b058480c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"8.2 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-7acf752118a690cf79293e62f26c3e0d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"8.8 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-7acf752118a690cf79293e62f26c3e0d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.302%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.23008. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-141bd80b9d96758f38987ba1b058480c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.689Z"},{"id":"sr-7acf752118a690cf79293e62f26c3e0d","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35676","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-35676","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"},{"id":"sr-141bd80b9d96758f38987ba1b058480c","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-35676","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.277Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe password reset API can be triggered without authentication and without any out-of-band confirmation step.\n\nIf an attacker knows a valid `username + email` pair, they can call the reset endpoint directly. The application immediately generates a new password, writes it to the account, and only then sends the new password by email.\n\nThis creates two issues at the same time:\n\n- account enumeration through the response difference between valid and invalid pairs\n- forced password reset of another user's account, which invalidates the old password immediately\n\nIn my local reproduction, I confirmed both the response difference and the password change itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe relevant code is in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php`.\n\nThe route is exposed without authentication:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]\npublic function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse\n```\n\nThe flow is straightforward:\n\n```php\n$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);\n\nif ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {\n    $newPassword = $user->createPassword();\n ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe password reset API can be triggered without authentication and without any out-of-band confirmation step.\n\nIf an attacker knows a valid `username + email` pair, they can call the reset endpoint directly. The application immediately generates a new password, writes it to the account, and only then sends the new password by email.\n\nThis creates two issues at the same time:\n\n- account enumeration through the response difference between valid and invalid pairs\n- forced password reset of another user's account, which invalidates the old password immediately\n\nIn my local reproduction, I confirmed both the response difference and the password change itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe relevant code is in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php`.\n\nThe route is exposed without authentication:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]\npublic function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse\n```\n\nThe flow is straightforward:\n\n```php\n$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);\n\nif ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {\n    $newPassword = $user->createPassword();\n ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:21.342Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.216Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:45:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.689Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005019","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Unauthenticated Password Reset Endpoint Allows User Enumeration and Forced Password Change Without Token Validation","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","CVE-2026-35676"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-073d7b12a231a5cfefd52d183ab0a060"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.302%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.23012. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-073d7b12a231a5cfefd52d183ab0a060"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9qv9-8xv6-5p35","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.689Z"},{"id":"sr-073d7b12a231a5cfefd52d183ab0a060","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-35676","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe password reset API can be triggered without authentication and without any out-of-band confirmation step.\n\nIf an attacker knows a valid `username + email` pair, they can call the reset endpoint directly. The application immediately generates a new password, writes it to the account, and only then sends the new password by email.\n\nThis creates two issues at the same time:\n\n- account enumeration through the response difference between valid and invalid pairs\n- forced password reset of another user's account, which invalidates the old password immediately\n\nIn my local reproduction, I confirmed both the response difference and the password change itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe relevant code is in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php`.\n\nThe route is exposed without authentication:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]\npublic function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse\n```\n\nThe flow is straightforward:\n\n```php\n$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);\n\nif ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {\n    $newPassword = $user->createPassword();\n ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d72dfe74c95344e8c227617821a0eed"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe password reset API can be triggered without authentication and without any out-of-band confirmation step.\n\nIf an attacker knows a valid `username + email` pair, they can call the reset endpoint directly. The application immediately generates a new password, writes it to the account, and only then sends the new password by email.\n\nThis creates two issues at the same time:\n\n- account enumeration through the response difference between valid and invalid pairs\n- forced password reset of another user's account, which invalidates the old password immediately\n\nIn my local reproduction, I confirmed both the response difference and the password change itself.\n\n### Details\n\nThe relevant code is in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/UnauthorizedUserController.php`.\n\nThe route is exposed without authentication:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: 'user/password/update', name: 'api.private.user.password', methods: ['PUT'])]\npublic function updatePassword(Request $request): JsonResponse\n```\n\nThe flow is straightforward:\n\n```php\n$loginExist = $user->getUserByLogin($username);\n\nif ($loginExist && $email === $user->getUserData('email')) {\n    $newPassword = $user->createPassword();\n ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.222Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.216Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:45:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.689Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}