{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005214","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Cas2Handler Derives CAS service URL from Client Host Header → Cross-Service Ticket Replay","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","CVE-2026-45074"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-d29c525314e3f93827539f9cbe0ecfc9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:35:14.170Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:35:14.170Z","value":"7.6 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.488%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4207. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-d29c525314e3f93827539f9cbe0ecfc9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"},{"id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45074","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45074","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-d29c525314e3f93827539f9cbe0ecfc9","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45074","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T01:52:04.805Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.154Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T21:11:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005214","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Cas2Handler Derives CAS service URL from Client Host Header → Cross-Service Ticket Replay","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","CVE-2026-45074"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:35:14.170Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T15:35:14.170Z","value":"7.6 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"},{"id":"sr-01f7aaf73f30fa995a5d6a2fc6bdac18","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45074","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45074","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.498Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.154Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T21:11:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005214","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony's Cas2Handler Derives CAS service URL from Client Host Header → Cross-Service Ticket Replay","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","CVE-2026-45074"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/security-http, symfony/security-http, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/security-http. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-j8gj-9rm5-4xhx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/security-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.1.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-86aaf546fe605bc6835dae066af2a9fc"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`Cas2Handler` builds this `service` parameter from `Request::getSchemeAndHttpHost()`, which reflects the attacker-controlled HTTP `Host` header whenever Symfony's `framework.trusted_hosts` setting is not configured (the default). An attacker who controls any *other* application registered with the same CAS server can replay a victim's ticket against the Symfony application, with a spoofed `Host` header, and be authenticated as that victim.\n\n### Resolution\n\nA new required `service_url` configuration option is introduced on `Cas2Handler`. The CAS `service` parameter sent to the validation endpoint is now built from this configured URL instead of being derived from the request's `Host` header, preventing cross-service ticket replay via Host header spoofing.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available here for branch 7.4.\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.455Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.154Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T21:11:59.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.439Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}