{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005234","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","CVE-2026-46366"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-09dbd29a65dc8e5637546482f882e9e5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.337%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27309. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-09dbd29a65dc8e5637546482f882e9e5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46366","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-09dbd29a65dc8e5637546482f882e9e5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T00:24:57.658Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.416Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:45:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005234","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","CVE-2026-46366"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-d32121ecb0cdde13da6e7bfdb5d51e1a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.337%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27196. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-d32121ecb0cdde13da6e7bfdb5d51e1a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46366","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-d32121ecb0cdde13da6e7bfdb5d51e1a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T01:52:04.807Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:45:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005234","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","CVE-2026-46366"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46366","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-08870bf8ba02bf9549dedb72917c6b96"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.805Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-09T00:00:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:45:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005234","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","CVE-2026-46366"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"sr-058324530e39f000a007a841ff57597e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46366","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46366","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.504Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.315Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:45:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005234","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","CVE-2026-46366"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-87578473e9e5a6b1d583cab5a75734e0"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ's `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content////.html`, leaking the FAQ's existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect's `Location` header and the redirected page's canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        'SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata f","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.457Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:46.315Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:45:01.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.684Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}