{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005334","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","CVE-2026-48736"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/http-client, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/http-client. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-08542ecfd98210a34a4b9c62c6fdb364"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T03:12:24.813Z","value":"8.6 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T03:12:24.813Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.570%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47209. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-08542ecfd98210a34a4b9c62c6fdb364"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48736","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-48736","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:22.913Z"},{"id":"sr-08542ecfd98210a34a4b9c62c6fdb364","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48736","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.855Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.024Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:07.914Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:31:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005334","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","CVE-2026-48736"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/http-client, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/http-client. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T03:12:24.813Z","value":"8.6 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T03:12:24.813Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.570%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47228. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-5e949dae939143f5013b30f591b113f9","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48736","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-48736","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:22.913Z"},{"id":"sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48736","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.381Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.275Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:07.914Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:31:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005334","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","CVE-2026-48736"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/http-client, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/http-client. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.570%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47228. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-6e6368142587af8f4d13ff222828b97b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48736","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.381Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.578Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:07.914Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:31:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005334","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony: IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS Omits IPv6 Transition Forms (6to4, NAT64, Teredo, IPv4-compatible): SSRF Bypass in NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","CVE-2026-48736"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/http-client, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/http-foundation, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/http-client. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/http-foundation. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.4.53 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.41 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.13 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-38cx-cq6f-5755","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/http-foundation","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0; fixed 5.4.53"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.4.0; fixed 6.4.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b527f52bc44928eb2bf3c78073a016d"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`Symfony\\Component\\HttpClient\\NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` is documented as a decorator that blocks requests to private networks by default. The list of blocked subnets (`Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils::PRIVATE_SUBNETS` on 6.4+, a private constant in `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` on 5.4) enumerates RFC1918, loopback, link-local and IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`) prefixes, but omits the remaining IPv6 transition forms that can embed a private IPv4 destination: 6to4 (`2002::/16`, RFC 3056), Teredo (`2001::/32`, RFC 4380), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, RFC 6052 and `64:ff9b:1::/48`, RFC 8215) and IPv4-compatible IPv6 (`::/96`, RFC 4291 §2.5.5.1).\n\n`IpUtils::checkIp6()` is a pure bitwise CIDR comparison against the constants list and never extracts the embedded IPv4, so an attacker who can supply a URL writes the loopback / RFC1918 IPv4 target as e.g. `http://[2002:7f00:1::]/` (6to4 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[64:ff9b::7f00:1]/` (NAT64 → 127.0.0.1), `http://[::7f00:1]/` (IPv4-compatible → 127.0.0.1) or `http://[2001::1]/` (Teredo). `IpUtils::isPrivateIp()` returns `false` and `NoPrivateNetworkHttpClient` dispatches the request.\n\nReal-world reachability of the embedded ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.13"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.460Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:07.914Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-15T17:31:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}