{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005381","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","CVE-2026-69246"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for guzzlehttp/guzzle, guzzlehttp/guzzle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-074496c12cd8745af04ef1c6690501bf"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.15.2 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.1 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-03T21:07:27.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:41:31.497Z","value":"7.2 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.370%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30928. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-074496c12cd8745af04ef1c6690501bf"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"},{"id":"sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69246","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-69246","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"},{"id":"sr-074496c12cd8745af04ef1c6690501bf","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-69246","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.861Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.014Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005381","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","CVE-2026-69246"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for guzzlehttp/guzzle, guzzlehttp/guzzle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.15.2 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.1 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-03T21:07:27.000Z","value":"7.2 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:41:31.497Z","value":"7.2 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"},{"id":"sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69246","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-69246","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["< 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2686f75f83827deb3fe83ef18a8ca623"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 8.0.0, < 8.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.550Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005381","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","CVE-2026-69246"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for guzzlehttp/guzzle, guzzlehttp/guzzle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.15.2 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.1 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:41:31.497Z","value":"7.2 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"sr-11bddf2c7ceb975d4f8e8bf0383b301f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69246","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-69246","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.526Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:14.592Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005381","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Guzzle: Noncanonical host can bypass host-based checks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","CVE-2026-69246"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for guzzlehttp/guzzle, guzzlehttp/guzzle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.15.2 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.1 for guzzlehttp/guzzle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-v5mv-p594-2x33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 7.15.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8d03a811cca1c5206de107bea7de8fa6"],"technology":"guzzlehttp/guzzle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nIn affected versions, Guzzle gives a transport the request URI as text and supplies the `Host` header separately. The cURL handlers set `CURLOPT_URL` to the URI exactly as written and push that `Host` into `CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER`; `StreamHandler` does the same through `fopen()`. libcurl then parses the authority itself, percent-decoding it and, on an IDN-capable build, applying IDNA mapping, and uses the result to resolve, connect, name the TLS peer and address a proxy `CONNECT`, while the supplied `Host` suppresses the aligned one it would have generated. In `http://127.0.0.%31/` the URI host is one `filter_var()` rejects as an IP literal, yet libcurl decodes it to `127.0.0.1` and reaches loopback with no DNS lookup while the server receives `Host: 127.0.0.%31`.\n\nAn attacker who influences a fetched URI can therefore reach a host the application's checks excluded and read whatever it exposes of the response. The same divergence moves Guzzle's own decisions onto a spelling the transport does not use: `no_proxy` selects proxy routing from the literal host, and `RedirectMiddleware` decides from it whether to strip `Authorization` and `Cookie`. The cookie middleware extracts ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.462Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:14.592Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T21:07:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.370Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}