{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has stored XSS via Utils::parseUrl() in comment rendering","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","CVE-2026-46367"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-08T23:58:15.000Z","value":"7.6 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-07f49eb55cd1b1ff655ee121aeb4e003"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.6 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.3 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-07f49eb55cd1b1ff655ee121aeb4e003","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-06T20:58:31.464Z"},{"id":"sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"},{"id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46367","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46367","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-07f49eb55cd1b1ff655ee121aeb4e003"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-07f49eb55cd1b1ff655ee121aeb4e003"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["= 4.1.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:39.803Z","source_updated_at":"2026-06-08T23:58:15.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:10:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has stored XSS via Utils::parseUrl() in comment rendering","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","CVE-2026-46367"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"7.6 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T14:10:00.130Z","value":"8.3 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"},{"id":"sr-710562d1088eb10b68791cb4f5b6e35f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46367","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-46367","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.325Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.171Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:10:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005430","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ has stored XSS via Utils::parseUrl() in comment rendering","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","CVE-2026-46367"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.2 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9525-27vj-c8r8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f3d6430f33190cd11216c54e1cac7c1"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA stored XSS vulnerability in the comment rendering pipeline allows an authenticated user to inject JavaScript that executes for every visitor of an affected FAQ or News page. An attacker with a registered account can steal admin session cookies and take over the application.\n\n### Details\n\n`Utils::parseUrl()` (`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Utils.php`, line 281) converts URLs in comment text into clickable `` tags at render time:\n\n    $pattern = '/(https?:\\/\\/[^\\s]+)/i';\n    $replacement = '$1';\n    return preg_replace($pattern, $replacement, $string);\n\nThe regex `[^\\s]+` matches `\"` and `<`, and the URL is inserted into the href attribute with no htmlspecialchars() call. A URL with a literal `\"` closes the attribute early and allows injecting event handlers like onmouseover.\n\nThis only reaches the sink when `main.enableCommentEditor` is enabled. In that path, comment text goes through `sanitizeHtmlComment()` instead of `FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS` — which encodes `\"` — so the double-quote survives to storage. The comment is then passed through parseUrl() and rendered via `{{ comment.comment|raw }}` in `comment.macros.twig` (line 40), which disables Twig","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.1; fixed 4.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.464Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.171Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-06T20:10:48.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.679Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}