{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005492","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","CVE-2026-68500"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a6bacd6c6df5fd1e15e463ba80dd693a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.8 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.2.4 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.3.1 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-31T16:52:41.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.681%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.52468. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a6bacd6c6df5fd1e15e463ba80dd693a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"},{"id":"sr-a6bacd6c6df5fd1e15e463ba80dd693a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-68500","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.3.0, < 3.3.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.3.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.191Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-31T16:52:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-31T16:52:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005492","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","CVE-2026-68500"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.8 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.2.4 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.3.1 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-31T16:52:41.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5986751c7147fc43653db2dc9105b42e"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.3.0, < 3.3.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.3.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.569Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-31T16:52:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-31T16:52:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005492","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","CVE-2026-68500"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin, sylius/mollie-plugin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.8 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.2.4 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.3.1 for sylius/mollie-plugin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.2.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0; fixed 3.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-91fbf9ff09d08de9871daef870de1457"],"technology":"sylius/mollie-plugin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n  The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route\n  `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled\n  parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the\n  Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the\n  Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.\n\n  An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example\n  from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim\n  `orderId`. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to `completed` (or any other\n  Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs\n  are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate\n  limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.\n  \n  ### Patches\n  Fixed in versions **2.2.8**, **3.2.4** and **3.3.1**. The webhook now binds the payment to\n  the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment\n  was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.3.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:01.467Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-31T17:00:21.344Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-31T16:52:39.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.361Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}