{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005513","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization Bypass","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","CVE-2026-52839"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.0 for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-29T16:26:27.000Z","value":"3.3 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-24T21:10:00.130Z","value":"3.3 LOW (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-82b8422ad87ae3c397d6be1969f0f764"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.178%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07384. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"},{"id":"sr-82b8422ad87ae3c397d6be1969f0f764","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52839","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52839","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52839","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.\n \nA normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation\nThe `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:\n \n```php\n// Appointments.php\nif ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {\n    foreach ($appointments as $index => $appointm","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.\n \nA normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation\nThe `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:\n \n```php\n// Appointments.php\nif ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {\n    foreach ($appointments as $index => $appointm","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:21.354Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:26:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:26:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005513","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization Bypass","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","CVE-2026-52839"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.0 for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-29T16:26:27.000Z","value":"3.3 low","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.178%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07384. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"},{"id":"sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"},{"id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52839","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-015548fbc3b88c80e785c6d70b1f747e"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.\n \nA normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation\nThe `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:\n \n```php\n// Appointments.php\nif ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {\n    foreach ($appointments as $index => $appointm","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.\n \nA normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation\nThe `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:\n \n```php\n// Appointments.php\nif ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {\n    foreach ($appointments as $index => $appointm","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.531Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:26:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:26:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005513","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Easy!Appointments appointments/store and appointments/update allow cross-provider appointment injection — Authorization Bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","CVE-2026-52839"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for alextselegidis/easyappointments. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.0 for alextselegidis/easyappointments. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.178%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07384. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-w8xc-8g92-v77h","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"},{"id":"sr-122fc4cde54c15f4040c8f8a2c49081e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52839","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-92da010331f9524b5831d2d52fa75664"],"technology":"alextselegidis/easyappointments","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n \nEasy!Appointments correctly filters provider-scoped appointments in the `appointments/search` response, proving that provider isolation is an intended security boundary. However, the direct mutation endpoints `appointments/store` and `appointments/update` only check generic appointment privileges and never verify that the submitted `id_users_provider` belongs to the current session.\n \nA normal authenticated provider can inject new appointments into another provider's schedule via `store`, or reassign existing appointments into a foreign provider's calendar via `update`. The `store` path contains an additional write-before-crash bug: the unauthorized row is committed to the database before the controller crashes on a type error, so the attacker receives an error response while the foreign appointment is already persisted.\n \n---\n \n## Root Cause — Step by Step Code Flow\n \n### Step 1 — Search correctly enforces provider isolation\nThe `search` endpoint filters out appointments belonging to other providers — proving provider isolation is an intended boundary:\n \n```php\n// Appointments.php\nif ($role_slug === DB_SLUG_PROVIDER) {\n    foreach ($appointments as $index => $appointm","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:48.409Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-29T16:30:34.632Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-29T16:26:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:41.385Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}