{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005643","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius: IDOR on Shop Payment Request API endpoints","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","CVE-2026-53639"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1cc686e24183df98f1cbc3cac082aea1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.6 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:04:42.813Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45666. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1cc686e24183df98f1cbc3cac082aea1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:40.400Z"},{"id":"sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53639","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-1cc686e24183df98f1cbc3cac082aea1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.787Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.1.0, < 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.2.0, < 2.2.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.404Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005643","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius: IDOR on Shop Payment Request API endpoints","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","CVE-2026-53639"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.6 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:04:42.813Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45632. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:34:40.400Z"},{"id":"sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53639","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.1.0, < 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-21ba74e4fa51568be56e8d07b990ca9a"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.2.0, < 2.2.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.417Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005643","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius: IDOR on Shop Payment Request API endpoints","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","CVE-2026-53639"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.6 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-09T21:04:42.813Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45632. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"sr-08c3d8c35abf0dcdcedb1df527b9425c","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53639","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.508Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-09T21:26:42.075Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005643","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Sylius: IDOR on Shop Payment Request API endpoints","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","CVE-2026-53639"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius, sylius/sylius. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.18 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.2.6 for sylius/sylius. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45632. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mr9r-h354-966r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"},{"id":"sr-00ee69d78f53154a62111ced01d43b1b","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-53639","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.0.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.1.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9720317acf00023f0cbece9051f08184"],"technology":"sylius/sylius","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe `GET /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` and `PUT /api/v2/shop/payment-requests/{hash}` endpoints look up the payment request solely by the hash from the URL. No ownership check is performed against the authenticated customer or the underlying order.\n\nAn attacker who obtains a payment request hash can:\n\n- read the payment request and, through the `payment` IRI in the response, recover the underlying order's `tokenValue` (which itself grants access to the full order, items, addresses, customer email, totals);\n- update the payment request payload (e.g. `target_path`, `after_path`). These fields are used by the front-end controller to redirect the user after the payment, so an attacker can flip them to an attacker-controlled URL and intercept the buyer.\n\nThe hash is a UUID, so it has to be obtained out-of-band (logs, shared links, referrer headers, a co-located client), but once it is known no other credential is required, neither authentication nor knowledge of the order token.\n\nThe creation endpoint `POST /api/v2/shop/orders/{tokenValue}/payment-requests` shares the same flaw: it resolves the target order solely from the `tokenValue` in the URL without verifying tha","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.2.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:44.212Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-09T21:26:42.075Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-09T21:03:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.982Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}