{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005747","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via NumberFormat @ Text Substitution in HTML Writer","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","CVE-2026-35453"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.5 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.5 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.16 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5b92e9df4276e40904f30312dc37904b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T21:10:00.143Z","value":"5.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5b92e9df4276e40904f30312dc37904b"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T21:10:00.143Z","value":"4.8 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5b92e9df4276e40904f30312dc37904b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.941Z"},{"id":"sr-5b92e9df4276e40904f30312dc37904b","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35453","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-35453","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:23.484Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.7.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.271Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:50:49.240Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-28T22:50:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.941Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005747","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via NumberFormat @ Text Substitution in HTML Writer","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","CVE-2026-35453"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.5 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.5 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.16 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.941Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.7.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.16"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9afb80d40d10c8a04a2abe1aa09e423d"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n    $origData2,\n    $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n    [$this, 'formatColor']\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n    && preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n    if (!str_contains($format, '\"')) {\n        return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);\n    }\n    return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw val","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.837Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:50:49.240Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-28T22:50:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:59.941Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}