{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005809","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","CVE-2026-62993"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-117150317f4a3ad25f06557c0223b66a"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.574%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47372. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-117150317f4a3ad25f06557c0223b66a"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"sr-117150317f4a3ad25f06557c0223b66a","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62993","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.860Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.608Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-01T16:45:03.888Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-01T16:38:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005809","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","CVE-2026-62993"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0aab575e164807d89fd2740c71b5cbc5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.574%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.47384. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0aab575e164807d89fd2740c71b5cbc5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"sr-0aab575e164807d89fd2740c71b5cbc5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62993","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.284Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:07.842Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-01T16:45:03.888Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-01T16:38:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005809","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","CVE-2026-62993"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1a3357b47e14867f56bf24fc47e8aa59"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.574%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4739. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1a3357b47e14867f56bf24fc47e8aa59"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"sr-1a3357b47e14867f56bf24fc47e8aa59","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-62993","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.384Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.600Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-01T16:45:03.888Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-01T16:38:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005809","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Smarty: SSRF via redirect bypass of trusted_uri using {fetch}","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","CVE-2026-62993"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for smarty/smarty, smarty/smarty. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.8.2 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.7 for smarty/smarty. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cq55-c7wv-pxmq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0; fixed 5.8.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d8df7b46c9739a90b5d767632a4afd8"],"technology":"smarty/smarty","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"When a Security policy is active, {fetch} validates the requested remote URL against the trusted_uri allowlist via Security::isTrustedUri(). For non-http:// schemes (e.g. https://) the resource was then read with file_get_contents(), which follows HTTP redirects by default. Because isTrustedUri() only validates the initial URL, an open redirect on an otherwise-trusted host could be used to redirect the request to a non-trusted, internal target — bypassing the trusted_uri policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a fetch target (or influence one) and who has an open redirect available on a trusted host can cause the server to issue requests to attacker-chosen internal endpoints, defeating the trusted_uri allowlist (server-side request forgery).\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in 5.8.2. When a security policy is active, {fetch} now passes a stream context that disables redirect following (follow_location => 0, max_redirects => 1) to file_get_contents() for remote resources. Behavior is unchanged when no security policy is set, since there is no trusted_uri to bypass.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAvoid fetching remote resources from within templates under untrusted control; ensure hosts listed in trusted","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.839Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-01T16:45:03.888Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-01T16:38:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.702Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}