{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005881","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Craft CMS has unauthenticated activation email trigger with potential user enumeration","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","CVE-2026-29069"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for craftcms/cms, craftcms/cms. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.9.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.17.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3e49b1e44c17f8bfaaddfa7e7dc5950f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:29:32.760Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:29:32.760Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.317%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.2468. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3e49b1e44c17f8bfaaddfa7e7dc5950f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29069","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-29069","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:56.268Z"},{"id":"sr-3e49b1e44c17f8bfaaddfa7e7dc5950f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-29069","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.271Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.9.0-beta.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0-RC1; fixed 4.17.0-beta.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.768Z","source_updated_at":"2026-03-04T21:11:18.468Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-03-04T20:52:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005881","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Craft CMS has unauthenticated activation email trigger with potential user enumeration","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","CVE-2026-29069"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for craftcms/cms, craftcms/cms. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.9.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.17.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:29:32.760Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-17T10:29:32.760Z","value":"6.9 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.317%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24684. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"sr-df95d2a7c4d033f856a38031e7582fe8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29069","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-29069","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:56.268Z"},{"id":"sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-29069","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.376Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.9.0-beta.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0-RC1; fixed 4.17.0-beta.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.464Z","source_updated_at":"2026-03-04T21:11:18.468Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-03-04T20:52:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005881","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Craft CMS has unauthenticated activation email trigger with potential user enumeration","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","CVE-2026-29069"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for craftcms/cms, craftcms/cms. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.9.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.17.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.317%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.24684. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"sr-438a32aabcce51b202c9223d2afc824f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-29069","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.376Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.9.0-beta.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0-RC1; fixed 4.17.0-beta.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:17.226Z","source_updated_at":"2026-03-04T21:11:18.468Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-03-04T20:52:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005881","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Craft CMS has unauthenticated activation email trigger with potential user enumeration","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","CVE-2026-29069"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for craftcms/cms, craftcms/cms. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.9.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.17.0-beta.2 for craftcms/cms. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-234q-vvw3-mrfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.0.0-RC1; fixed 5.9.0-beta.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a0293cbdd8514968896c506f86c5e9e9"],"technology":"craftcms/cms","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The `actionSendActivationEmail()` endpoint is accessible to unauthenticated users and does not require a permission check for pending users. An attacker with no prior access can trigger activation emails for any pending user account by knowing or guessing the user ID. If the attacker controls the target user’s email address, they can activate the account and gain access to the system.\n\nThe vulnerability is not that anonymous access exists - there’s a legitimate use case for it. The vulnerability is that the endpoint accepts arbitrary `userId` parameters without verifying ownership.\n\nCraft CMS allows public user registration. When a user registers but doesn’t receive their activation email (spam filter, typo correction, etc.), they need a way to request a resend. This is why `send-activation-email` is in the `allowAnonymous` array - it’s intentional self-service functionality.\n\n### The Security Gap\n\nThe endpoint accepts `userId` as the identifier:\n```php\n$userId = $this->request->getRequiredBodyParam('userId');\n```\n\nThis allows any visitor to trigger activation emails for any pending user, not just their own registration.\n\n---\n\n## Background\n\nWhen administrators create new user acco","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0-RC1; fixed 4.17.0-beta.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.842Z","source_updated_at":"2026-03-04T21:11:18.468Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-03-04T20:52:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:40.008Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}