{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006151","kind":"vulnerability","title":"adawolfa/isdoc: Uncontrolled resource consumption (decompression bomb) when reading untrusted ISDOCX or PDF files","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.5.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.4.3 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-15T23:30:57.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:26.779Z"},{"id":"sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.444Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.6.0, < 1.6.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.5.0, < 1.5.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.4.0, < 1.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-73db6370ee526a32d915b5b7b39f1a8f"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.4.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.6.0; fixed 1.6.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.5.0; fixed 1.5.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.4.0; fixed 1.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-05T19:10:21.475Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-15T23:30:57.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-15T23:30:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.444Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006151","kind":"vulnerability","title":"adawolfa/isdoc: Uncontrolled resource consumption (decompression bomb) when reading untrusted ISDOCX or PDF files","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc, adawolfa/isdoc. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.6.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.5.1 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.4.3 for adawolfa/isdoc. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xg43-5579-qw6v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.444Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.6.0; fixed 1.6.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.5.0; fixed 1.5.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 1.4.0; fixed 1.4.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-a973251e3b8ebb582bfb319d7da5953b"],"technology":"adawolfa/isdoc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\n`adawolfa/isdoc` reads ISDOC invoices from ISDOCX (ZIP) archives and from PDF files with embedded ISDOC documents and supplements. Affected versions inflate ZIP entries and read embedded files **without validating their uncompressed size**, so a small crafted file can amplify into gigabytes:\n\n- **ISDOCX decompression bomb** — `getFromName()` inflates the ISDOC document and binary supplements with no size cap.\n- **`saveTo()` disk-fill** — the supplement copy loop writes inflated bytes to disk with no running byte budget, so a bomb can exhaust disk even if the central-directory size is under-reported.\n- **PDF embedded files** — an embedded file whose declared `Length` is enormous is read and digested with no upper bound.\n\nExploitation requires the application to parse an attacker-supplied `.isdocx` or `.pdf` (the typical use is generating files or parsing files from trusted vendors, so a user must be induced to process a malicious file). When that happens the process can be driven to exhaust memory or disk, causing denial of service. There is **no confidentiality or integrity impact** — availability only.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.4.3**, **1.5.1**, **1.6.1** and **2.0.0*","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.871Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:12.659Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-15T23:30:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.444Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}