{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006206","kind":"vulnerability","title":"October CMS: Safe Mode Sandbox Bypass via Session Store and Forwarded Builder Calls","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","CVE-2026-46696"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for october/system, october/system. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.7.17 for october/system. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. 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Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-46696","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.855Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"technology":"october/system","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed a chained bypass when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled. The Laravel session store was exposed to Twig with unrestricted method access, and raw SQL methods reachable through Eloquent's `__call` forwarding were not blocked across the full builder chain. When combined, a backend user with CMS markup editing access could read arbitrary database values via raw SQL expressions and write to the backend authentication session key, forging a backend session as another existing user.\n\n**Scope of impact is narrow.** Safe Mode is a niche feature, primarily used for demo installations and multi-tenant or shared-editor scenarios where untrusted users are deliberately granted access to the CMS markup editor. 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This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 3.7.17 for october/system. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.23 for october/system. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-778ae983bbfcbd025cb450ea678f2041"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.273%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19755. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-778ae983bbfcbd025cb450ea678f2041"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.449Z"},{"id":"sr-778ae983bbfcbd025cb450ea678f2041","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-46696","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"technology":"october/system","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed a chained bypass when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled. The Laravel session store was exposed to Twig with unrestricted method access, and raw SQL methods reachable through Eloquent's `__call` forwarding were not blocked across the full builder chain. When combined, a backend user with CMS markup editing access could read arbitrary database values via raw SQL expressions and write to the backend authentication session key, forging a backend session as another existing user.\n\n**Scope of impact is narrow.** Safe Mode is a niche feature, primarily used for demo installations and multi-tenant or shared-editor scenarios where untrusted users are deliberately granted access to the CMS markup editor. 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When combined, a backend user with CMS markup editing access could read arbitrary database values via raw SQL expressions and write to the backend authentication session key, forging a backend session as another existing user.\n\n**Scope of impact is narrow.** Safe Mode is a niche feature, primarily used for demo installations and multi-tenant or shared-editor scenarios where untrusted users are deliberately granted access to the CMS markup editor. Standard production deployments do not enable Safe Mode, because under normal October CMS guidance backend access - including markup editing - is restricted to trusted administrators, and direct PHP injection through markup is already possible without Safe Mode in that configuration.\n\n**This issue only affects sites that meet all of the following conditions:**\n- `cms.safe_mode` is enabled (a deliberate opt-in for demos ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.2.23"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.605Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-14T16:15:09.420Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-14T16:02:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.449Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006206","kind":"vulnerability","title":"October CMS: Safe Mode Sandbox Bypass via Session Store and Forwarded Builder Calls","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","CVE-2026-46696"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for october/system, october/system. 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This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xv9m-fm3w-8w5x","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.449Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"technology":"october/system","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed a chained bypass when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled. The Laravel session store was exposed to Twig with unrestricted method access, and raw SQL methods reachable through Eloquent's `__call` forwarding were not blocked across the full builder chain. When combined, a backend user with CMS markup editing access could read arbitrary database values via raw SQL expressions and write to the backend authentication session key, forging a backend session as another existing user.\n\n**Scope of impact is narrow.** Safe Mode is a niche feature, primarily used for demo installations and multi-tenant or shared-editor scenarios where untrusted users are deliberately granted access to the CMS markup editor. Standard production deployments do not enable Safe Mode, because under normal October CMS guidance backend access - including markup editing - is restricted to trusted administrators, and direct PHP injection through markup is already possible without Safe Mode in that configuration.\n\n**This issue only affects sites that meet all of the following conditions:**\n- `cms.safe_mode` is enabled (a deliberate opt-in for demos ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 3.7.17"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab342c00651701d9da7ba91333823281"],"technology":"october/system","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A vulnerability was identified in the Twig sandbox security policy that allowed a chained bypass when `cms.safe_mode` is enabled. The Laravel session store was exposed to Twig with unrestricted method access, and raw SQL methods reachable through Eloquent's `__call` forwarding were not blocked across the full builder chain. When combined, a backend user with CMS markup editing access could read arbitrary database values via raw SQL expressions and write to the backend authentication session key, forging a backend session as another existing user.\n\n**Scope of impact is narrow.** Safe Mode is a niche feature, primarily used for demo installations and multi-tenant or shared-editor scenarios where untrusted users are deliberately granted access to the CMS markup editor. Standard production deployments do not enable Safe Mode, because under normal October CMS guidance backend access - including markup editing - is restricted to trusted administrators, and direct PHP injection through markup is already possible without Safe Mode in that configuration.\n\n**This issue only affects sites that meet all of the following conditions:**\n- `cms.safe_mode` is enabled (a deliberate opt-in for demos ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.0.0; fixed 4.2.23"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:05.875Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-14T16:15:09.420Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-14T16:02:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.449Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}