{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006249","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","CVE-2026-54179"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-40d39792736d29ac3c5babbc8dc808f3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","value":"4.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T21:11:31.703Z","value":"4.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-834539fde53526a8c31213490f4fb520"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.261%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17909. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-40d39792736d29ac3c5babbc8dc808f3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-834539fde53526a8c31213490f4fb520","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54179","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-40d39792736d29ac3c5babbc8dc808f3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.282Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.774Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006249","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","CVE-2026-54179"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","value":"4.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T21:11:31.703Z","value":"4.4 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-834539fde53526a8c31213490f4fb520"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.261%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17916. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-834539fde53526a8c31213490f4fb520","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54179","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:21.355Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006249","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","CVE-2026-54179"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","value":"4.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.261%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17916. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"},{"id":"sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, < 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4363b137e498608bb34cc66bbd3fb7ea"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, < 7.0.38"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.562Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006249","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","CVE-2026-54179"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.261%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.17916. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"sr-268f8030320e620231cddd7393200ae1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54179","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:09.616Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:48:08.031Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006249","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Laravel Backpack CRUD: SingleBase64Image accepts any base64 payload behind a `data:image` prefix — SVG-with-script lands on the public disk","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","CVE-2026-54179"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for backpack/crud, backpack/crud. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.8.14 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.0.38 for backpack/crud. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8hw4-7qjr-3wxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.0.0; fixed 6.8.14"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ad47a14efdd8937a1e356fccfb992736"],"technology":"backpack/crud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`SingleBase64Image::uploadFiles` — the uploader bound to `image`-typed fields via `withFiles()` — only verifies that the submitted value starts with the string `data:image`. The MIME subtype and the base64-decoded bytes are never inspected or validated. A related bug in `FileNameGenerator` causes the stored file to receive an extensionless filename, because `mime_content_type()` returns `false` when given a data URI instead of a filesystem path.\n\nThe combination allows an authenticated admin to store a file of arbitrary type on the configured disk under a name without a recognizable extension.\n\n### Details\n\n```php\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/SingleBase64Image.php\nif (Str::startsWith($value, 'data:image')) {\n    // MIME subtype and decoded bytes are not validated\n    $base64Image = Str::after($value, ';base64,');\n    $finalPath   = $this->getPath() . $this->getFileName($value);\n    Storage::disk($this->getDisk())->put($finalPath, base64_decode($base64Image));\n    return $finalPath;\n}\n\n// src/app/Library/Uploaders/Support/FileNameGenerator.php\nprivate function getExtensionFromFile(string|UploadedFile $file): string\n{\n    return is_a($file, UploadedFile::class, true)\n   ","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.0.38"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.044Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T18:48:08.031Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T18:38:43.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.670Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}