{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006338","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","CVE-2026-35672"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-02bafde36d3a119439900d4033a8fc51"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.483%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41756. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-02bafde36d3a119439900d4033a8fc51"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35672","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-35672","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"},{"id":"sr-02bafde36d3a119439900d4033a8fc51","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-35672","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.325Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.239Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.842Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:46:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006338","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","CVE-2026-35672"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-26T13:10:00.140Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.483%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41649. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"sr-003375393d6ba0e071c1d836291ce2fa","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35672","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-35672","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:23:52.242Z"},{"id":"sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-35672","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:07.476Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.842Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:46:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006338","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","CVE-2026-35672"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.483%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41649. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"sr-3c136775edad3f635193241203ed8a51","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-35672","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:27:15.298Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.842Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:46:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006338","kind":"vulnerability","title":"phpMyFAQ: Default Empty API Token Authentication Bypass","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","CVE-2026-35672"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for thorsten/phpmyfaq, phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for thorsten/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.1.3 for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-gp95-j463-vv28","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"thorsten/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b0a6cab605952310676abb768738c2b3"],"technology":"phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA default empty API client token allows any unauthenticated user to create and modify FAQ entries, categories, and questions via the REST API. The vulnerability exists in all versions since API v4.0 was introduced because the installation process seeds `api.apiClientToken` with an empty string, and the `hasValidToken()` comparison logic cannot distinguish between \"no token configured\" and \"attacker sent a matching empty token header.\"\n\n### Details\n\nThe root cause is in two files:\n\n**1. Installation default** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Installation/DefaultDataSeeder.php`, line 277-278):\n\n```php\n'api.enableAccess'   => 'true',\n'api.apiClientToken' => '',       // ← defaults to empty string\n```\n\n**2. Authentication check** (`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php`, line 198-204):\n\n```php\nprotected function hasValidToken(): void\n{\n    $request = Request::createFromGlobals();\n    if ($this->configuration->get('api.apiClientToken') !== $request->headers->get('x-pmf-token')) {\n        throw new UnauthorizedHttpException('\"x-pmf-token\" is not valid.');\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe method uses strict inequality (`!==`). When `api.apiClientToken` is `''` (default) and the attacker sends `","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.1.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.051Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:51:05.842Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-20T15:46:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.420Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}