{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006416","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: The registration module re-sends activation mails","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","CVE-2026-107843"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T20:54:07.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-16T17:17:04.113Z","value":"5.3 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5b7f1286a206c8ea0a243b32f77a8a4a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.270%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19251. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"},{"id":"sr-5b7f1286a206c8ea0a243b32f77a8a4a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107843","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-107843","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:38.141Z"},{"id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107843","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T20:21:10.271Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:07.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006416","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: The registration module re-sends activation mails","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","CVE-2026-107843"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-09T20:54:07.000Z","value":"5.3 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.270%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19251. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:22.124Z"},{"id":"sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"},{"id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107843","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-9d1b4c63995e7212ebfd6ce004a81a3d"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.4.0-RC1, < 5.7.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.628Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:07.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006416","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Contao: The registration module re-sends activation mails","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","CVE-2026-107843"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for contao/core-bundle, contao/core-bundle. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.3.50 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.7.12 for contao/core-bundle. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.270%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19251. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-mfxh-vp55-7gc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"},{"id":"sr-10e3dfe08f83451b6501ae0dcadb097e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-107843","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.373Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 5.3.50"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b436727556bc8d64bc2188311756064b"],"technology":"contao/core-bundle","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"`ModuleRegistration::compile()` reaches its follow-up registration branch on **any** POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither `FORM_SUBMIT` nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and `resendActivationMail()` leads to `OptInToken::send()`, which has no rate limit at all.\n\n### Impact\n\nAnyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for \"this address has a pending registration on this site\", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.\n\n**Honest bound.** The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is `tl_member.disable = 1` together with an unconfirmed `reg-` opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where `reg_activate` is off the branch is unreachable.","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 5.4.0-RC1; fixed 5.7.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:48.406Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-09T21:00:10.232Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-09T20:54:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:30.978Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}