{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006445","kind":"vulnerability","title":"FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","CVE-2026-92161"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fof/oauth, fof/oauth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3a155694e65d7aa3efd5d4ac4c7e5638"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.0-beta.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","value":"9.8 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"9.8 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-757ad95e0ca9a5dc00aa6b73d909d0a8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.272%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19597. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-3a155694e65d7aa3efd5d4ac4c7e5638"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"sr-757ad95e0ca9a5dc00aa6b73d909d0a8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92161","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-92161","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:08.112Z"},{"id":"sr-3a155694e65d7aa3efd5d4ac4c7e5638","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-92161","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:11.296Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0-beta.1, < 2.0.0-beta.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0-beta.1; fixed 2.0.0-beta.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.757Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T15:55:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006445","kind":"vulnerability","title":"FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","CVE-2026-92161"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fof/oauth, fof/oauth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.0-beta.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","value":"9.8 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","value":"9.8 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-757ad95e0ca9a5dc00aa6b73d909d0a8"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.272%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19599. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"sr-757ad95e0ca9a5dc00aa6b73d909d0a8","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92161","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-92161","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:08.112Z"},{"id":"sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-92161","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.386Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0-beta.1, < 2.0.0-beta.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0-beta.1; fixed 2.0.0-beta.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:18.512Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T15:55:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006445","kind":"vulnerability","title":"FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","CVE-2026-92161"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fof/oauth, fof/oauth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.0-beta.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","value":"9.8 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.272%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.19599. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"sr-74d41955b7b78185f91b86edce04576d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-92161","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.386Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0-beta.1, < 2.0.0-beta.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0-beta.1; fixed 2.0.0-beta.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.599Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T15:55:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006445","kind":"vulnerability","title":"FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","CVE-2026-92161"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for fof/oauth, fof/oauth. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.0-beta.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","value":"9.8 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17e15022acf417f40f81436dd30081b1"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0-beta.1, < 2.0.0-beta.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0-beta.1; fixed 2.0.0-beta.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.903Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T20:31:30.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T15:55:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006445","kind":"vulnerability","title":"FriendsOfFlarum OAuth: Unauthenticated account takeover via unverified email trust in Discord OAuth provider","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","CVE-2026-92161"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for fof/oauth, fof/oauth. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 1.7.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.0-beta.4 for fof/oauth. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-g7vj-c29h-3h5m","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.7.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b542dc77d88e8821a5d0365ed3ed0dfa"],"technology":"fof/oauth","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated account takeover vulnerability exists in `fof/oauth` when the Discord OAuth provider is enabled.\n\nDiscord allows an account to use an unverified email address when its phone number has been verified. During OAuth authentication, Discord may return that email address with `\"verified\": false`.\n\nAffected versions of `fof/oauth` did not validate this flag and passed the email address to Flarum core as trusted via `provideTrustedEmail()`. Flarum core could then match the trusted email address to an existing user, link the attacker-controlled Discord identity to that user, and authenticate the attacker as the victim.\n\nAn attacker who knows a user's email address can therefore take over the corresponding Flarum account without knowing its password or requiring any interaction from the victim. This includes administrator accounts.\n\n#### Preconditions for exploitation\n\n1. Discord sign-in is enabled on the forum.\n2. The victim has a Flarum account with a known email address.\n3. The victim's email address is not already associated with a Discord account.\n4. The attacker creates or configures a Discord account using the victim's email address without verifying it","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0-beta.1; fixed 2.0.0-beta.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.057Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T20:45:04.906Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T15:55:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:20.413Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}