{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006527","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin: OIDC `sub` collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0192df06acac85fd50bb454cb37edec9"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.5 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-24T21:56:06.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0192df06acac85fd50bb454cb37edec9"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0192df06acac85fd50bb454cb37edec9","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:59:04.660Z"},{"id":"sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0192df06acac85fd50bb454cb37edec9"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.1.0, < 4.2.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0192df06acac85fd50bb454cb37edec9"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.3.0, < 4.3.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.2.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.531Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T21:56:06.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T21:56:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006527","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin: OIDC `sub` collation bypass in Poweradmin leading to account takeover","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.5 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-cmwh-g2h8-c222","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.1.0; fixed 4.2.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b834f6aff75054a418c324ed3d7bc904"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Preface\n\nPoweradmin maps OIDC identities into local users through `oidc_user_links.oidc_subject` plus `provider_id`. In the MySQL schema, the OIDC link table explicitly uses `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`, which is case-insensitive and accent-insensitive. OIDC `sub` is a stable external subject identifier and should be matched byte-for-byte within the issuer/provider scope.\n\nThe confirmed local PoC used two different OIDC users:\n\n- Victim subject: `victim-login`\n- Attacker subject: `victím-login` (`í`, U+00ED)\n\nMySQL reported those two subjects as equal under `utf8mb4_unicode_ci`. After the victim linked their OIDC account, the attacker authenticated to the same provider with the attacker's own password and Poweradmin resolved the session to the victim's local account.\n\n## Server Info\n\n- **Application:** Poweradmin\n- **Version:** `targets/poweradmin` git `e1f9c9a`\n- **Database:** MySQL `8.4.10`, `character_set_server=utf8mb4`, `collation_server=utf8mb4_unicode_ci`\n- **Access Permissions:** Any user who can create or control an account in the connected OIDC provider\n- **Auth Method:** OIDC generic provider\n- **Tools:** Docker Compose, local OIDC provider, Python PoC harness\n\n**Affected Ent","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.061Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-24T22:00:26.986Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T21:56:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.701Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}