{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006553","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","CVE-2026-48009"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for shopware/platform, shopware/platform, shopware/core, shopware/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-17T20:17:19.973Z","value":"6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-d69c9d989a8e7c3c5250c14435c5ffbe"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.457%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3965. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"sr-d69c9d989a8e7c3c5250c14435c5ffbe","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48009","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-48009","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:22.913Z"},{"id":"sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48009","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.452Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:48.965Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-04T19:27:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006553","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","CVE-2026-48009"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for shopware/platform, shopware/platform, shopware/core, shopware/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.457%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.3965. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"sr-7eebbc1fa50bc4d6792d18a425f2e354","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-48009","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T19:14:01.624Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:48.965Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-04T19:27:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006553","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","CVE-2026-48009"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for shopware/platform, shopware/platform, shopware/core, shopware/core. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/platform. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.7.10.1 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.6.10.18 for shopware/core. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/platform","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.7.0.0; fixed 6.7.10.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-b9941a3f302a2943455faf2d1c8b7092"],"technology":"shopware/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.\n\n**OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API search endpoint (`POST /api/search/user-recovery`). The `hash` field lacks `ApiAware(false)` or `ReadProtection`, so any user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can read it.\n\nThe password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.\n\n**Three endpoints combine to form the attack:**\n\n1. `POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery` — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (**no auth required**)\n2. `POST /api/search/user-recovery` — reads the hash (**requires only `user_recovery:read` ACL**)\n3. `PATCH /api","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 6.6.10.18"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.062Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:48.965Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-04T19:27:15.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:10.675Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}