{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006777","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","CVE-2026-54588"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.3 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-06-25T20:18:11.603Z","value":"9.6 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-d4801081e3f2a2d43be9e3f0eead2ac3"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45654. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-d4801081e3f2a2d43be9e3f0eead2ac3","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54588","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54588","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:31.710Z"},{"id":"sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54588","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.787Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T22:29:23.449Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.408Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-28T16:40:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006777","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","CVE-2026-54588"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.3 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45654. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-212f5ff7ddd524fa74666fa189cdb52d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54588","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:44:07.787Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.428Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.408Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-28T16:40:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006777","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","CVE-2026-54588"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.3 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-cd88caf49c6bdb0bcb0bcef200e7f6bd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.543%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.4562. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-cd88caf49c6bdb0bcb0bcef200e7f6bd"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"sr-cd88caf49c6bdb0bcb0bcef200e7f6bd","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54588","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.382Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T21:03:48.039Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.408Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-28T16:40:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006777","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Poweradmin has Host Header Injection in OIDC redirect_uri, SAML ACS/SLO URL, and Logout Redirect Construction.","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","CVE-2026-54588"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for poweradmin/poweradmin, poweradmin/poweradmin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.2.4 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.3.3 for poweradmin/poweradmin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-3735-5339-xfwx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 4.2.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c23a7a5f5c4653f300284b7bc555a23d"],"technology":"poweradmin/poweradmin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPoweradmin v4.3.2 uses the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the\n  authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout\n  authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison\n  the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the\n  victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full\n  account takeover with no credentials required.\n\n  Three independent code paths are affected:\n\n  - **Primary (Critical):** `OidcService::getCallbackUrl()` - `redirect_uri` poisoning\n  - **Secondary (High):** `SamlConfigurationService::getBaseUrl()` - SAML ACS/SLO URL poisoning\n  - **Tertiary (Medium):** `LogoutController::getBaseUrl()` - post-logout redirect poisoning\n\n### Details\n\n***Root Cause***\n\n  The application constructs absolute URLs dynamically from `HTTP_HOST` rather than\n  from a trusted configured base URL. The header is fully client-controlled and is not\n  validated before use in any authentication flow.\n\n  Poweradmin's own codebase contains the correct pattern -\n  `DocsController::getValidatedHost()` (line 244) calls `isValidHostname()` before\n  usi","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.3.0; fixed 4.3.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.073Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:51.408Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-28T16:40:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:41:49.652Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}