{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00006800","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Phalcon: Catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in the default Phalcon Router route lead to remote unauthenticated DoS","revision":5,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","CVE-2026-57584"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phalcon/cphalcon. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0834cf4ddba897bee9f7e3dcc72078b4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.15.0 for phalcon/cphalcon. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.532%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45126. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0834cf4ddba897bee9f7e3dcc72078b4"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"},{"id":"sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57584","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-57584","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"},{"id":"sr-0834cf4ddba897bee9f7e3dcc72078b4","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-57584","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:17:46.389Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.14.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.409Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006800","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Phalcon: Catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in the default Phalcon Router route lead to remote unauthenticated DoS","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","CVE-2026-57584"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phalcon/cphalcon. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-249ed97802ba6c091f20e1d8742b63ed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.15.0 for phalcon/cphalcon. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.532%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.44988. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-249ed97802ba6c091f20e1d8742b63ed"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"},{"id":"sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57584","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-57584","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"},{"id":"sr-249ed97802ba6c091f20e1d8742b63ed","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-57584","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.283Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.14.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.190Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006800","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Phalcon: Catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in the default Phalcon Router route lead to remote unauthenticated DoS","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","CVE-2026-57584"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phalcon/cphalcon. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.15.0 for phalcon/cphalcon. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"},{"id":"sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"sr-830da2d1b791471c03fd28c7c9f6d40e","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57584","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-57584","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:39.943Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.14.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:21.354Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006800","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Phalcon: Catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in the default Phalcon Router route lead to remote unauthenticated DoS","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","CVE-2026-57584"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for phalcon/cphalcon. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.15.0 for phalcon/cphalcon. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"},{"id":"sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-66637f263006cc74a8d388f3fc8d83f6"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.14.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.364Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:33.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"},{"id":"NVI-00006800","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Phalcon: Catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS) in the default Phalcon Router route lead to remote unauthenticated DoS","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","CVE-2026-57584"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for phalcon/cphalcon. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 5.15.0 for phalcon/cphalcon. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-x7rj-f32v-7jjg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-c2f170e2ff857cbf9ccef3807c3ea944"],"technology":"phalcon/cphalcon","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEvery Phalcon MVC application built with a default router (`new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router()` or `new Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router(true)`, which is the normal case) registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern is `#^/([\\w0-9\\_\\-]+)/([\\w0-9\\.\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u`. The trailing `(/.*)*` is a nested quantifier whose group body (`/.*`) overlaps itself (`.` matches `/`, and there is no `s`/DOTALL flag), so when the final `$` is forced to fail the engine explores roughly `2^(N/2)` ways to split a run of `N` slashes, causing classic catastrophic backtracking. `Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router::handle()` runs on **every** request and matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI, so a single short request can burn seconds-to-minutes of CPU per request. The same `(/.*)*` construct is also produced by the `/:params` placeholder (`Phalcon\\Mvc\\Router\\Route::compilePattern()`) and by the CLI router (`Phalcon\\Cli\\Router` / `Phalcon\\Cli\\Router\\Route`).\n\n\n## Details \n\nThe vulnerable pattern is emitted in four places, all carrying the same `*` nested quantifier:\n\n- Default MVC route registration `phalcon/Mvc/Router.zep` (`Router::__construct()`): `\"#^/([\\\\w0-9\\\\_\\\\-]+)/([\\\\w0-9\\\\.\\\\_]+)(/.*)*$#u","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 5.15.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:10.085Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T16:15:06.433Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T16:06:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.441Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}