{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007068","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony has an HtmlSanitizer allowLinkHosts() / allowMediaHosts() Bypass via URL-Parser Differentials and  Misclassification","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","CVE-2026-45066"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0026fc4c7ed3dbcd50d29ab8d3533578"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T15:16:31.367Z","value":"6.1 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"nvd@nist.gov severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-84ab20e2aaf9399b06d7635eee6ac24a"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-16T15:16:31.367Z","value":"2.3 LOW (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-84ab20e2aaf9399b06d7635eee6ac24a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.338%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27226. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0026fc4c7ed3dbcd50d29ab8d3533578"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"sr-84ab20e2aaf9399b06d7635eee6ac24a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45066","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-45066","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:11.754Z"},{"id":"sr-0026fc4c7ed3dbcd50d29ab8d3533578","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45066","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.854Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:21.356Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.394Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T20:13:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007068","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony has an HtmlSanitizer allowLinkHosts() / allowMediaHosts() Bypass via URL-Parser Differentials and  Misclassification","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","CVE-2026-45066"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-49fe2d2754b123957591a800da84702e"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.338%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.27242. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-49fe2d2754b123957591a800da84702e"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"sr-49fe2d2754b123957591a800da84702e","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-45066","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.379Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T23:18:17.261Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.394Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T20:13:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007068","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Symfony has an HtmlSanitizer allowLinkHosts() / allowMediaHosts() Bypass via URL-Parser Differentials and  Misclassification","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","CVE-2026-45066"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/html-sanitizer, symfony/symfony, symfony/symfony. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/html-sanitizer. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 6.4.40 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 7.4.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 8.0.12 for symfony/symfony. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-qc95-4862-92fh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/html-sanitizer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 6.1.0; fixed 6.4.40"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 7.0.0; fixed 7.4.12"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-cd5782a17171042e00947d59f43a51f5"],"technology":"symfony/symfony","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Description\n\n`symfony/html-sanitizer` lets applications sanitise untrusted HTML. The configuration methods `allowLinkHosts([...])` and `allowLinkSchemes([...])` are intended to restrict `` targets to an allowlist of hosts/schemes; `allowMediaHosts()` / `allowMediaSchemes()` do the same for `` etc.\n\nThree distinct bypasses allow a content author to smuggle off-allowlist URLs past these checks. First, `UrlSanitizer::parse()` parses the input following RFC-3986, while browsers follow the WHATWG URL Standard which normalises `\\` to `/` before parsing the authority of \"special\" schemes; so an input like `https://evil\\@trusted.com/` parses with host `trusted.com` server-side but navigates to `https://evil/` in the browser. Second, WHATWG collapses any run of `/` after the scheme into `//`, while RFC-3986 does not; so `https:/evil.com/` and `https:///evil.com/` parse as host-less (skipping the host allowlist) but resolve to `evil.com` in the browser. Third, `UrlAttributeSanitizer` checks `'a' === $element` to route to the link policy and falls through to the media policy otherwise, but `` is a navigable hyperlink equivalent to ``; so `` was sanitis","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 8.0.0; fixed 8.0.12"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:14.310Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T03:50:47.394Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-05-27T20:13:04.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:31.001Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}