{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00007309","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PrivateBin has reflected JSON injection in backend responses via unescaped REQUEST_URI","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","CVE-2026-55891"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for privatebin/privatebin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-a489e7c85acbcc4755460dd7655d6f8c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.5 for privatebin/privatebin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.539%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45387. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-a489e7c85acbcc4755460dd7655d6f8c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-278e7d6d623f19b66421bf26dba14a4d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"},{"id":"sr-a489e7c85acbcc4755460dd7655d6f8c","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-55891","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-10-31T22:06:15.383Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-278e7d6d623f19b66421bf26dba14a4d"],"technology":"privatebin/privatebin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\nA reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:\n\n```php\npublic function getRequestUri()\n{\n    $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : '';\n    return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri;\n}\n```\n\n`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `\"`, `'`, `` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).\n\nIn `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:\n\n```php\n$content = str_replace(\n    '?jsonld=',\n    $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=',\n    file_get_contents($file)\n);\n...\nheader('Content-type: application/ld+json');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"technology":"privatebin/privatebin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\nA reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:\n\n```php\npublic function getRequestUri()\n{\n    $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : '';\n    return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri;\n}\n```\n\n`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `\"`, `'`, `` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).\n\nIn `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:\n\n```php\n$content = str_replace(\n    '?jsonld=',\n    $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=',\n    file_get_contents($file)\n);\n...\nheader('Content-type: application/ld+json');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T02:53:03.186Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T20:25:35.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T20:25:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007309","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PrivateBin has reflected JSON injection in backend responses via unescaped REQUEST_URI","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","CVE-2026-55891"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for privatebin/privatebin. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-278e7d6d623f19b66421bf26dba14a4d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.5 for privatebin/privatebin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-278e7d6d623f19b66421bf26dba14a4d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-278e7d6d623f19b66421bf26dba14a4d"],"technology":"privatebin/privatebin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\nA reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:\n\n```php\npublic function getRequestUri()\n{\n    $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : '';\n    return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri;\n}\n```\n\n`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `\"`, `'`, `` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).\n\nIn `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:\n\n```php\n$content = str_replace(\n    '?jsonld=',\n    $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=',\n    file_get_contents($file)\n);\n...\nheader('Content-type: application/ld+json');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.0.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"technology":"privatebin/privatebin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\nA reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:\n\n```php\npublic function getRequestUri()\n{\n    $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : '';\n    return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri;\n}\n```\n\n`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `\"`, `'`, `` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).\n\nIn `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:\n\n```php\n$content = str_replace(\n    '?jsonld=',\n    $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=',\n    file_get_contents($file)\n);\n...\nheader('Content-type: application/ld+json');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.192Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T20:25:35.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T20:25:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"},{"id":"NVI-00007309","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PrivateBin has reflected JSON injection in backend responses via unescaped REQUEST_URI","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","CVE-2026-55891"],"plain_summary":"OSV carries this publisher advisory for privatebin/privatebin. This is an aggregated source copy; consult the original publisher and compare update dates.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 2.0.5 for privatebin/privatebin. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-xrjc-c68j-hp7w","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-d6ec83d0544c624925c645ea553da7b3"],"technology":"privatebin/privatebin","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\nA reflected JSON injection allows an attacker to return arbitrary data in the JSON endpoints (like ` /?jsonld=` and `/?pasteid`).\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`Request::getRequestUri()` sanitizes `$_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']` with `FILTER_SANITIZE_URL`:\n\n```php\npublic function getRequestUri()\n{\n    $uri = array_key_exists('REQUEST_URI', $_SERVER) ? filter_var($_SERVER['REQUEST_URI'], FILTER_SANITIZE_URL) : '';\n    return empty($uri) ? '/' : $uri;\n}\n```\n\n`FILTER_SANITIZE_URL` does **not** strip `\"`, `'`, `` characters (per the PHP manual's allowed-character list for this filter). So the raw, attacker-controlled request URI (including query string) passes through almost unmodified into `Controller::$_urlBase` (set in `_init()`).\n\nIn `Controller::_jsonld()`, `$_urlBase` is spliced directly into one of the static `.jsonld` templates (`js/types.jsonld`, `js/paste.jsonld`, etc.) with a plain `str_replace()`, without any JSON-escaping:\n\n```php\n$content = str_replace(\n    '?jsonld=',\n    $this->_urlBase . '?jsonld=',\n    file_get_contents($file)\n);\n...\nheader('Content-type: application/ld+json');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');\nheader('Access-Control-Allow-Methods","public_affected_ranges":["ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 2.0.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-10-31T22:13:14.329Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T20:40:37.666Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-28T20:25:34.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T21:42:51.448Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"40769"}